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I. INTRODUCTION

In Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown,I and DaimlerAG v.
Bauman,2 the Supreme Court by unanimous decisions clarified the law of
general personal jurisdiction, the power of a state to require defendants to
answer all lawsuits, whether or not the claims are related to the defendants'
presence or activity in the state. 3 Goodyear held that the Due Process Clause
prevented North Carolina from exerting personal jurisdiction over foreign tire
manufacturers allegedly responsible for a defective tire that led to the deaths of
two North Carolina residents in France. 4 Daimler held that the Due Process
Clause prevented California from exerting personal jurisdiction over a German
corporation for allegedly participating in atrocities during the "Dirty War" in
Argentina that led to the deaths and injuries of non-California residents in
Argentina. 5 Specific or litigation-related personal jurisdiction was not available
in either case because none of the defendants' tortious conduct occurred in
North Carolina or California.
Justice Ginsburg, writing for the Court in both cases, emphasized the
historical roots of the Court's approach to general jurisdiction. Rejecting
arguments for broad general jurisdiction as "exorbitant" 6 and "grasping," 7 she
contrasted specific or conduct-linked jurisdiction, which has evolved to become

I Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (2011).
2
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
3
Id. at 754 (defining general jurisdiction).
4
See Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2857. See generally Michael H. Hoffheimer, General
PersonalJurisdictionAfter Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations S.A. v. Brown, 60 KAN. L.
REv. 549 (2012) (discussing the history of the case and identifying questions raised by the
opinion).
5
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 750-51. The plaintiffs commenced the action in federal court
in California. Under federal rules, the federal court's personal jurisdiction is governed by the
personal jurisdiction available in state court in California. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A).
6
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751. It is not clear whether she meant to employ the term
"exorbitant" in the technical way that it applies in European practice to transient jurisdiction
based on quasi in rem jurisdiction. See generallyRUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.8, at 198-200 (6th ed. 2010) (discussing exclusion of exorbitant
jurisdiction from EU regulations).
7
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761.
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"the centerpiece of modem jurisdiction theory," 8 and general jurisdiction, which
remains strictly limited to its traditional forms. 9 Goodyear announced that
general jurisdiction exists only where the corporate affiliations are "so
'continuous and systematic' as to render [the foreign corporation] essentially at
home in the forum State."' 0 Daimler further signals that, except for truly
exceptional circumstances, a corporation is "at home" only in its states of
incorporation and principal place of business.1 1
Despite the Court's assurance that its decisions are guided by tradition,
Daimler departs from settled law under which corporations have been subject
to jurisdiction for all claims in states where they maintained a sufficient
permanent presence or engaged in a comparable substantial level of business. 12

8 Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854 (quoting Mary Twitchell, The Myth of General
Jurisdiction,101 HARV. L. REv. 610, 628 (1988)), quoted in Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755.
9
"[W]e have declined to stretch general jurisdiction beyond limits traditionally
recognized." Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757-58.
10
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851, quoted in Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 n. 11. In Daimler,
she added the significant clarification that this requires affiliations "comparable to a domestic
enterprise in that State." Id.
11
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. Without expressly approving an exception, the Court
observed, "[w]e do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case a corporation's
operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place of
business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in
that State." Id. at 761 n. 19 (citation omitted). Nevertheless, the Court cited Perkins v.
Benguet ConsolidatedMining Co. as a case to illustrate the possibility of an exception. Id.
at 756-57 (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)). Elsewhere,
the Court insisted on characterizing the corporation's contacts in Perkins as establishing a
de facto principal place of business. Id. at 756 (citing Perkins, 342 U.S. at 448).
12 See infra Part III.C. Encouraged by the Supreme Court and supported by many lower
court decisions, legal treatises repeated the doctrine that corporations were subject to general
jurisdiction where they engaged in substantial, systematic, and continuous activity. See 36
AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations§ 417 (2011); 16D C.J.S. ConstitutionalLaw § 1753
(2005); 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODS. LIAB. § 29:7 (3d ed. 2000); see also Burnham v.
Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 610 n.1 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (plurality opinion) ("We have said that
'[e]ven when the cause of action does not arise out of or relate to the foreign corporation's
activities in the forum State, due process is not offended by a State's subjecting the
corporation to its in personam jurisdiction when there are sufficient contacts between the
State and the foreign corporation."' (quoting Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984))). While Goodyear announced a significant change, leading
treatises assumed the law remained well-settled even after that decision. See 4 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & ADAM N. STEINMAN, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PROCEDURE § 1067.5 (Supp. 2014) ("Ifthe Goodyear opinion stands for anything, aside from
the limited proposition that stream of commerce theory is an inappropriate base for general
jurisdiction, it simply reaffirms that defendants must have continuous and systematic
contacts with the forum in order to be subject to general jurisdiction."); 16 JAMES WM.
MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 108.41 (3d ed. 2014) ("Like the test for
minimum contacts, the test for substantiality [for general jurisdiction] appears to be flexible.
It generally requires an analysis of the strength and duration of the contacts and the nature
of the litigation .... .").
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The law was so well settled that large corporations in leading cases did not even
challenge general jurisdiction over them. 13
In previous decisions, the Court placed limits on contacts-based general
jurisdiction but never disapproved ofit.14 Most recently, Goodyearclarified that
limited sales in a state would not support general jurisdiction over manufacturers
for claims unrelated to those sales.1 5 The Court's opinion adopted a more
restrictive approach by declaring that for a state to exercise general jurisdiction,
a corporation's affiliations with a state must be "so 'continuous and systematic'
as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum State."' 6 While acknowledging
that such jurisdiction exists at a corporation's place of incorporation and
principal place of business, the opinion did not restrict general jurisdiction to
those "paradigm" places.
Daimler is a game changer. In advancing the policy goal of giving
corporations the power to limit states where they must answer legal claims, the
Court shrinks the places of general jurisdiction against many large corporations

13

See Bauman v. Daimlercrysler Corp. (Bauman 1), 644 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2011)
(discussing Daimler AG's failure to challenge the finding that its subsidiary Mercedes-Benz
USA, LLC was subject to general jurisdiction in California).
In World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980), New York
residents were injured in Oklahoma by an Audi they bought in New York. While the East
Coast distributor and retailer successfully challenged specific jurisdiction, the manufacturer
did not challenge personal jurisdiction in the Oklahoma trial court, and the U.S. importer
raised the defense at trial but waived the defense on appeal in the state courts. Id. at 288 n.3.
A leading civil procedure textbook implies that the manufacturer did not raise the defense
because general jurisdiction was recognized under the law at that time. See STEPHEN C.
YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE

109 (8th ed. 2012) (quoting World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v.

Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 297 (1980) ("[I]f the sale of a product of a manufacturer or
distributor such as Audi or Volkswagen is not simply an isolated occurrence, but arises from
the efforts of the manufacturer or distributor to serve, directly or indirectly, the market for
its product in other States, it is not unreasonable to subject it to suit in one of those States if
its allegedly defective merchandise there has been the source of injury to others .... .")).
In Goodyear, the parent corporation did not challenge general jurisdiction in North
Carolina because it operated a major manufacturing facility, engaged in a high volume of
retail sales, and had appointed an agent to receive service of process in North Carolina. The
first question Justice Ginsburg raised at oral argument was the grounds for jurisdiction over
the parent. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 4, Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846 (No. 10-76).
Justice Kagan also inquired about general jurisdiction based on service on an appointed
agent. Id. The Court failed to address the issue in either Goodyear or Daimler, despite being
aware of a split among the Circuits. See id. at 5, 15.
14
See generallyPerkins, 342 U.S. 437; Helicopteros,466 U.S. 408; Burnham, 495 U.S.
604.
15
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851.
16 Id
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to one or two states. 17 The news media understandably greeted Daimler as
restricting the existing law of personal jurisdiction.' 8
The Court's conclusion that California's exercise of general jurisdiction in
Daimler violates due process may be correct given the unusual facts of the
case. 19 But the reasoning offered by Justice Ginsburg for the majority is
troubling, and Justice Sotomayor concurred in an opinion that sharply criticized
Justice Ginsberg's analysis. 2 0 In failing to acknowledge the Court's departure
from established law, Justice Ginsburg's opinion failed to mention, let alone
respectfully consider, decades of work by lower courts that, in repeatedly
addressing more common fact patterns, have acquired familiarity with the
21
practical problems and real life consequences presented by jurisdictional tests.
With few exceptions, Justice Ginsburg cited almost none of the voluminous
scholarship on general jurisdiction. 2 2 And while her opinions restricting general
jurisdiction evidence concern for the burdens facing corporations, these
opinions express no similar concern for the hardships they will impose on

17

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. The argument that general jurisdiction should be restricted
to place of incorporation and place of "continuous and systematic supervision of corporate
activities" was first proposed by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Brief for the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 3-4, Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. 2846
(No. 10-76) [hereinafter Brief for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce I].
18
E.g., Jess Bravin & Brent Kendall, Supreme Court Bars Rights Suit Against Daimler
in
California,
WALL
ST.
J.
(Jan.
14,
2014,
11:14
AM),
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 10001424052702303819704579320511383971756,
archived at http://perma.cc/Q6JC-DKTP ("The Supreme Court on Tuesday made it harder
to sue foreign corporations in U.S. courts . . . .") (emphasis added); Adam Liptak, Justices
Raise Bar for Suing Foreign Companies, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2014),
http://nyti.ms/19snplm, archived at http://perma.cc/AXK9-F4SC ("The Supreme Court on
Tuesday made it harder to sue foreign companies in American courts . .. .") (emphasis
added). Legal commentators agree. See Tanya J. Monestier, Where Is Home Depot 'at
Home'? Daimler v. Bauman and the End ofDoing Business Jurisdiction, 66 HASTINGS L.J.
233, 236 (2014) (declaring Daimler"marks a radical departure from decades of case law");
Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes and Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium
in PersonalJurisdiction,48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207,211 (2014) (stating that Daimler"tilted
the balance of power toward the defense side of the spectrum .... mak[ing] litigation more
difficult for plaintiffs .... .").
19
The authors have mixed attitudes about the specific result. For one, the analysis of
due process law and its application by the Ninth Circuit is most persuasive. For the other,
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence provides a reasonable analysis and application of due
process standards but does not provide a complete explanation for why the Ninth Circuit
determination should be reviewed de novo.
20
See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
21 See sources cited infra note 55 (collecting and discussing the work of lower courts);
see also Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing state and federal
decisions exercising contacts-based general jurisdiction).
22
See infra notes 253-54 and accompanying text (discussing influence of scholarship
by von Mehren and Trautman).
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injured individuals. 23 In a rush to protect defendants from the perceived evils of
forum shopping, the Court gives corporations unprecedented power to
predetermine what states or countries they can be sued in-and what law will
apply to them.
This Article examines the new law of general personal jurisdiction. Part II
briefly describes the scope of general jurisdiction before Daimler with the aim
of showing how far the Court departs from past practices. Part III discusses the
holding of Daimler. Part IV examines new issues raised by the decision that will
become the focus of future litigation. Part V considers constitutional
consequences of the Court's recent decisions.
This Article argues that the Court has moved too far, too fast towards
limiting the traditional power of states to require nonresident corporations to
answer lawsuits in their courts. While the latest decision may achieve a level of
certainty and predictability for which some commentators have longed, 24 it has
done so at the cost of restricting access to courts and through an exercise of
tenuous constitutional authority that trespasses on the power of states and
precludes more appropriate regulation by Congress.
II. A REALIST HISTORY OF GENERAL JURISDICTION

Justice Ginsburg's opinions treat the history of general jurisdiction as a
logical process culminating in the formal doctrines the Court now applies. 2 5
This history omits inconsistent trends 26 and neglects the actual scope ofjudicial
power exercised by state courts in the past. 27
23 "[I]t should be obvious that the ultimate effect of the majority's approach will be to
shift the risk of loss from multinational corporations to the individuals harmed by their
actions." Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); accord Kate Bonacorsi,
Note, Not at Home with 'At-Home'Jurisdiction,37 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1821, 1852 (2014)
(After Daimler, "U.S. plaintiffs are worse off now than ever before.").
24
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
25
See infra Part III.B.4.
26
The Court did not address how its departure from subsisting practices of jurisdiction
over corporations deviates from its approval of such practices in cases of transient
jurisdiction over individuals. See Bumham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990). Additionally,
it did not consider the transformation of divorce law where the court held that the domicile
of a single spouse establishes valid personal jurisdiction over the other. See Williams v.
North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298-99 (1942). Moreover, nor did it consider how the Court's
previous cases focused on the real in-state effects of corporate conduct rather than the legal
forms of corporate activity. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319-20 (1945)
(disregarding the fact that corporations structured relations to avoid entering contracts or
acquiring legal titles to property in states).
27 For more complete historical discussions of general jurisdiction, see Hoffheimer,
supra note 4, at 553-69; Collyn A. Peddie, Mi Casa Es Su Casa: Enterprise Theory and
GeneralJurisdictionover Foreign CorporationsAfter Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations,
S.A. v. Brown, 63 S.C. L. REv. 697, 713-15 (2012); Charles W. ("Rocky") Rhodes,
Nineteenth Century Personal JurisdictionDoctrine in a Twenty-First Century World, 64
FLA. L. REv. 387, 390-412, 422-24 (2012); S. Wilson Quick, Comment, Staying Afloat in
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This part shows that courts long exercised broad personal jurisdiction
without regard to the nature of claims. 28 It explains that the courts' traditional
focus on the forms by which litigation commenced prevented them from
developing a coherent doctrine of general jurisdiction. And it argues that
doctrines developed by the Court to support the expansion of specific
jurisdiction were never aimed at restricting general jurisdiction over
corporations to a small number of places.
A. GeneralIn Rem Jurisdiction
Before 1977, U.S. courts routinely exercised general jurisdiction under the
guise of quasi in rem jurisdiction. 29 Corporations with assets in a state were
subject to general jurisdiction to the extent of those assets. A corporation with a
sufficiently large level of activity in the state would in practice be subject to
general jurisdiction for all claims in all amounts.
Under this form of jurisdiction, New York courts in the 1930s exercised
jurisdiction in a case with remarkable parallels to the claims in Daimler. By
attaching assets owned by the German national railroad located in New York, a
German Jewish employee obtained in rem jurisdiction, forcing the German
corporation to answer his lawsuit in New York after the railroad followed Nazi
laws and fired the Jewish employee in Germany. 30
General in rem jurisdiction was common in the United States, 31 and it was
known to some foreign legal systems. 32 It did not provoke constitutional
controversy until courts began to exercise in rem jurisdiction over choses in
action, intangible property, and chattels that were brought into the forum state
by persons other than the owner or real party in interest. 33
the Stream of Commerce: Goodyear, McIntyre, and the Ship of PersonalJurisdiction, 37
N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 547, 553-62 (2011).
28 Before the 1900s, common law courts focused solely on the forum state's
relationship to the defendant and its property without regard to the nature of the claims.
Twitchell, supra note 8, at 614-15. All jurisdiction was general jurisdiction. Id.
29
See, e.g., Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977) (holding that general
jurisdiction in rem (or quasi in rem jurisdiction) must satisfy the due process standards the
Court applied to in personam jurisdiction and that "all" forms of jurisdiction must meet such
standards).
30
Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn-Gesellschaft, 277 N.Y. 474, 475 (1938) (no parallel
citation is provided because the summary of the procedural posture with reference to
jurisdiction by attachment is omitted in the regional reporter, 14 N.E. 2d 798 (N.Y. 1938)).
31 The proceedings in Ohio resulting in the leading Supreme Court decision recognizing
general jurisdiction in personam were preceded by an in rem action in California where
jurisdiction was not in issue. Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 132 P.2d 70, 78 (Cal.
Dist. Ct. App. 1942). Under the reasoning in Pennoyer v. Neff assets in Oregon provided a
sufficient basis for the exercise of state power. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 723 (1878).
32
See RUSSELL J. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4.8, at 199
(6th ed. 2010) (discussing history of general in rem jurisdiction in Germany).
33 Cf Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 224 (1905) (holding that the presence of the debtor
in the state supported in rem jurisdiction over the creditor's right to payment).
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The availability of in rem proceedings obviated the need for plaintiffs to
bring actions in personam that tested the outer limits of general jurisdiction. The
prevalence of in rem jurisdiction explains why the Court did not develop a
separate, comprehensive theory of general jurisdiction. And the corresponding
absence of such a theory most emphatically does not reveal any judicial
skepticism about general jurisdiction over corporations that were active in the
forum states. While jurisdiction existed at the place of incorporation and
principal place of business, those sites were not the only available places, and
they were not the places at which most litigation occurred. 34 They become
"paradigm" only in Justice Ginsburg's effort to compare general jurisdiction
over corporations to general jurisdiction based on domicile.
After in rem actions became subordinated to due process limits governing
actions in personam, courts began to address substantive limits on general
jurisdiction irrespective of the form of litigation. The Court held in Shaffer v.
Heitner that quasi in rem jurisdiction violated due process in the absence of
minimum contacts. 35 Justice Marshall declared broadly that "all assertions of
state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
InternationalShoe and its progeny." 36 But no one at that time thought general
jurisdiction was limited to a corporation's base of operations, and Justice
Marshall would have been astonished to learn that his words would one day
have the effect of eliminating state power over large corporations active in states
where they were routinely required to answer lawsuits in 1977.
B. Service on In-State Agents
As businesses expanded during the 1800s, states authorized service on
appropriate agents acting for the business in the state 37 and also enacted laws
requiring nonresident corporations to appoint agents to receive service of
process in the state in order to be qualified to do business in the state. 3 8 Pennoyer
v. Neff expressly approved of such service 39 and further authorized states to
34 This would be easy to demonstrate by a survey of appellate decisions in any
jurisdiction. But it is probably sufficient to note that Justice Ginsburg's history never claims
that most general jurisdiction was based on her paradigm theories and instead simply avoids
the reality of how jurisdiction was obtained in the vast number of cases, jurisdiction that the
Court now declares to be unconstitutional because it does not correspond to the paradigms.
35 Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 212 (1977).
36
1d. Shaffer involved claims against nonresident individuals for claims unrelated to
the forum state. Id. at 186. Accordingly, the appropriate substantive standard was minimum
contacts. Id. at 213.
37
See, e.g., Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 112 (1898); Tauza v. Susquehanna
Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915, 918 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.).
38 Every state requires foreign corporations doing business in the state to appoint an
agent for service of process in the state. Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Clarifying General
Jurisdiction,34 SETON HALL L. REv. 807, 856 (2004).
39
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735 ("Neither do we mean to assert that a State may not require
a non-resident entering into a partnership or association within its limits, or making contracts
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appoint agents on behalf of nonresidents doing business in a state when the
nonresidents failed to appoint agents. 40
Service on agents, especially those expressly authorized to receive service,
satisfied the due process requirements of Pennoyer for two reasons: an in-state
agent established the principal's physical presence in the state's territory, and
the appointment signaled the principal's consent to jurisdiction. Opinions
relying on the presence theory upheld general jurisdiction resulting from service
on agents appointed to receive service of process, 4 1 and courts similarly
approved service on any appropriate agent so long as the corporation was doing
business in the state. 42
Leading cases from International Shoe Co. v. Washington to Daimler
resulted from challenges to personal jurisdiction where defendant corporations
had not appointed agents to accept service in the forum state. 43 The Court and
scholars alike usually omit the important contextualizing language that precedes
the substantive rule: "[N]ow that the capiasad respondendum has given way to
personal service of summons or other form of notice, due process requires only
that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not
present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts"
with the forum. 44
While minimum contacts was thus offered as a conclusory label for the level
of activity sufficient to support jurisdiction, International Shoe contrasted
claims related to the activity in the state, where few contacts were sufficient,
and others, where more substantial activity was required. This distinction
enforceable there, to appoint an agent or representative in the State to receive service of
process and notice in legal proceedings instituted with respect to such partnership,
association, or contracts, or to designate a place where such service may be made and notice
given, and provide, upon their failure, to make such appointment or to designate such place
that service may be made upon a public officer designated for that purpose, or in some other
prescribed way . . . ."); id. ("[A] man who has agreed to receive a particular mode of
notification of legal proceedings should be bound by a judgment in which that particular
mode of notification has been followed . . . ." (quoting Vallee v. Dumergue, 4 Exch. 290,
154 Eng. Rep. 1221 (1849)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
40
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735.
41 See Bagdon v. Phila. & Reading Coal & Iron Co., 111 N.E. 1075, 1077 (N.Y. 1916).
The older process under which a defendant was arrested in the state by a capias established
the fact of jurisdiction by a direct exercise of sovereign authority. This was no longer the
case when the equity procedure was adopted under which a summons required a future
appearance. Such process could be delivered outside the state and, even if delivered in state,
required only a future performance. The delivery of such process neither guaranteed that it
was an expression of sovereign power nor assured its legality.
42
See, e.g., Barrow, 170 U.S. at 112; Tauza, 115 N.E. at 918.
43 In InternationalShoe, service was attempted by serving a sales solicitor of the
defendant in the forum state, but the defendant had not authorized the solicitor to receive
process and vigorously disputed whether the solicitors were agents in any sense; process was
also mailed to the defendant's corporate headquarters in St. Louis. Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 312 (1945).
44Id at 316 (emphasis added).
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provides the foundation for the subsequent bifurcation of cases into specific and
general jurisdiction and for the different due process standards for each. But at
the time, courts understood the "substantial" level of activity very differently.
They contrasted substantial activity not to minimum contacts but rather to an
occasional or transient level of activity that failed to establish the corporation's
presence in the state. As Judge Cardozo wrote, "[I]f [the business] is here, not
occasionally or casually, but with a fair measure of permanence and continuity,
then. . . it is within the [general] jurisdiction of our courts." 45
Service on agents of businesses that were present in this sense supported
very broad general jurisdiction. Moreover, in other decisions the Supreme Court
approved of service on agents expressly appointed to receive process under a
consent theory, holding that service on an agent actually appointed to receive
service established valid consent to general jurisdiction.4 6 And in 1927, the
Court upheld specific jurisdiction resulting from service on an agent
constructively appointed for claims arising from the defendant's in-state
conduct. 47
InternationalShoe replaced tests based on constructive presence and doing
business with a functional analysis of the nonresident's activity in the forum
state. 48 But the opinion did not repudiate older holdings; nor did it address
jurisdiction based on consent.49
C. Contacts-BasedJurisdictionBefore Daimler
Ironically, appellate decisions squarely addressing contacts-based general
jurisdiction over corporations that qualify to do business in-state and that do in
fact conduct substantial business there are uncommon simply because general
jurisdiction was so well established in such situations that corporate defendants
have not challenged jurisdiction.50
45 Tauza, 115 N.E. at 917.
46
See Pa. Fire Ins. Co. v. Gold Issue Mining & Milling Co., 243 U.S. 93, 96 (1917)
(Holmes, J.); St. Clair v. Cox, 106 U.S. 350, 356 (1882). In later decisions, the Court
narrowly construed state registration statutes so as to avoid reaching the question of whether
consent per se validates general jurisdiction. See generally Rhodes, supra note 27, at 43840 (discussing cases). But courts will be forced to address the validity of registration statutes
as plaintiffs, seeking to avoid the effects of Daimler, will increasingly be forced to rely on
such statutes to establish corporate consent to general jurisdiction. See Rhodes & Robertson,
supra note 18, at 258-63.
47
Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927) (upholding jurisdiction where the state
authorized service on a state official for claims arising from a nonresident motorist driving
on state roads).
48
Rhodes, supra note 38, at 856-57.
49
The effect of Daimler on personal jurisdiction resulting from service is discussed
infra Part IV.A.
50
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(2) (requiring that defense be supported by existing
law or good faith argument for modifying or reversing existing law or making new law).
Jones Day, a prominent law firm with many corporate clients, summarized its understanding
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Before Daimler, courts accepted the theory that sufficiently significant and
continuous contacts could support general jurisdiction. The Court expressly
approved of some contacts-based jurisdiction as early as Pennoyer.5 1 In
International Shoe and Perkins v. Benguet Mining Co., the Supreme Court
of the law in 2004: "General jurisdiction exists when a defendant has engaged in activities
that are sufficiently 'substantial, continuous, and systematic' to allow a court to exercise
jurisdiction over any cause of action, even unrelated to the defendant's specific activities in
the state." Ninth Circuit to Re-Examine PersonalJurisdictionover Internet Sellers, JONES
http://www.jonesday.com/ninth-circuit-to-re-examine-personal2004),
(May
DAY
jurisdiction-over-internet-sellers-05-14-2004/, archived at http:// perma.cc/R9GQ-LYF3
(citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co. 342 U.S. 437, 445 (1952)).
One online commentator asked rhetorically whether the Daimlerdecision constitutes
a "windfall" for defendants. Garrett Nemeroff, Daimler AG v. Bauman & The "Too Bigfor
General Jurisdiction" Phenomenon, INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW (Feb. 13, 2014),

http://inter-american-law-review.law.miami.edu/daimler-ag-v-bauman-too-big-generalDefense firms
jurisdiction-phenomenon/, archived at http://perma.cc/Y68T-2HJ8.
welcomed the decision. See Colin T. Kemp et al., Daimler AG v. Bauman: Court Again
Rejects a "Sprawling View of General Jurisdiction," PILLSBURY LAW (Jan. 22, 2014),
http://www.pillsburylaw.com/publications/daimler-ag-v-bauman-court-again-rejects-a-spra
wling-jurisdiction, archived at http://perma.cc/LU5B-XQLG; Vivek Krishnamurthy,
Daimler AG v. Bauman: In Latest ATS Decision, the Supreme Court Limits Jurisdictionof
U.S. Courts over Multinational Corporations, FOLEY HOAG, LLP (Jan. 18, 2014),
http://www.csrandthelaw.com/2014/01/daimler-ag-v-bauman-for-corporations-home-is-no
w-where-the-lawsuits-must-now-be/, archived at http://perma.cc/D37Q-KHWF; Stephen R.
Stegich & David P. Yates, Daimler AG v. Bauman: U.S. Supreme CourtAgain Applies Strict
Testfor "General"Jurisdictionover ForeignCorporateDefendants, CONDON & FORSYTHE,

LLP (Feb. 26, 2014), http://www.condonlaw.com/2014/02/daimler-ag-v-bauman-u-sants/,
supreme-court-applies-strict-test-general-jurisdiction-foreign-corporate-defend
archived at http://perma.cc/P26B-Q2A6; Supreme Court Reins in the JurisdictionalReach
of U.S. Courts over Foreign and Out-of-State Corporations, HOGAN LOVELLS (Jan. 16,
2014), http:// ehoganlovells.com/cv/ 07a26b5bb21d5bl3a712ac868a8f60da58e4ee7e,
archived at http://perma.cc/HS8S-SU4T; U.S. Supreme Court Sharply Limits General
Jurisdiction over Corporate Defendants, CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Jan. 16, 2014),
http://www.cgsh.com/us-supreme-court-sharply-limits-general-jurisdiction-over-corporatedefendants/, archivedat http://perma.cc/HT57-V6GW.
Commentators have predicted that Daimler gives large corporations "a ground to
contest jurisdiction outside of their home states" in cases where they previously conceded
the existence of jurisdiction. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 18, at 228. The developing
case law bears out this prediction. In a number of cases, large corporations have moved for
dismissal where before Daimler they probably would have conceded jurisdiction. See
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 228 Cal. App. 4th 605, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412 (Cal.
Ct. App.), review granted(Cal. 2014); Evans v. Johnson & Johnson, No. H-14-2800, 2014
WL 7342404, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014); Shrum v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., No. 3:14-cv03135-CSB-DGB, 2014 WL 6888446, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2014).
51 One of the puzzles in Daimler is the statement by Justice Ginsburg that Pennoyer
"held that a tribunal's jurisdiction over persons reaches no farther than the geographic
bounds of the forum." Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014) (citing Pennoyer
v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 720 (1878)). This inaccurate oversimplification is surprising from a
former Civil Procedure scholar. See Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 735 (authorizing extraterritorial
jurisdiction over associations and partnerships doing business in state).
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approved of general jurisdiction over corporations that maintained offices in a
state. 52 Over the years the Court's opinions repeatedly endorsed the idea of
contacts-based general jurisdiction. 53 The Court similarly held that soliciting
business in a state provided a sufficient nexus with the state so that the
imposition of taxes did not violate due process. 54 Lower courts uniformly found
general jurisdiction based on sufficient contacts, though the rule was so well
established they more often applied it in deciding complex cases involving more
attenuated contacts.ss
Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia and Goodyear announced some
restrictions. Helicopteros held that even significant and regular purchases did
not establish sufficient contacts for general jurisdiction. 56 Goodyear held that
due process prohibits general jurisdiction over a foreign manufacturer based on
the sale of its products in the forum state, or at least when the sales are limited
52

Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945) (citing with approval Tauza
v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917) (Cardozo, J.) (upholding jurisdiction
without regard to the nature of claims over a nonresident defendant with a local office in
state)); see infra note 191 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg's suggestion
in Daimlerthat Tauza and similar cases cited with approval in the past have been overruled).
In prior cases, the Court has expressed approval of general jurisdiction based on contacts
short of those required to establish a principal place of business. E.g., Helicopteros
Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 (1984) (observing that general
jurisdiction is proper based on "sufficient contacts"); id. at 417 (explaining that in a prior
case finding insufficient contacts, the defendant did not establish a place of business in the
forum or regularly carry on business there).
53
See generallyPerkins, 342 U.S. 437; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. 408; Burnham v. Super.
Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (Scalia, J.).
54
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 305-08, 313-14 (1992) (holding that
imposition of tax on mail order business would violate the "substantial nexus" test of the
Commerce Clause but not exceed Due Process Clause limits on state authority) (citing Int'l
Shoe, 326 U.S. 310; Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977); Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985)). At oral argument Justice Sotomayor also discussed
authority attributing a subsidiary's contacts to a parent for tax purposes does not violate due
process. Transcript of Oral Argument at 5-6, 19-20, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965)
(referring to Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159 (1983) (holding that state
treatment of parent and foreign subsidiaries as unitary businesses for tax purposes did not
violate due process)).
55
E.g., Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 341 F.3d 1072, 1078 (9th Cir. 2003),
dismissed as moot on other grounds, 398 F.3d 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding general
jurisdiction based on Internet activity); Lakin v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 348 F.3d 704, 709 (8th
Cir. 2003) (finding that the state could constitutionally exercise general jurisdiction over a
nonresident bank that maintained about $10 million in home-equity loans and lines of credit
to Missouri residents even though the loans constituted only one percent of the bank's loan
portfolio); Revell v. Lidov, 317 F.3d 467, 470-71 (5th Cir. 2002) (finding that Internet
business contacts with forum could be continuous and systematic and support general
jurisdiction); Bancroft & Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F.3d 1082, 1086 (9th Cir.
2000) (holding that Internet activity could be a functional equivalent of physical store but
insufficient contacts).
finding
56
See Helicopteros,466 U.S. at 411.
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in comparison to its products sold elsewhere and when the products enter the
state through intermediaries.5 7
Justice Ginsburg's opinion for the Court in Goodyear articulated a new
standard: a state may exercise general personal jurisdiction over foreign
corporations "when [the corporations'] affiliations with the State are so
'continuous and systematic' as to render them essentially at home in the forum
state." 58 And Justice Ginsburg's evaluation of the sales in that case indicated
that the Court might adopt a comparative approach under which contacts outside
the state might reduce the likelihood that a corporation's in-state activity would
constitute a home in the state. 59
Goodyear closed the door on the most expansive applications of general
jurisdiction. But like Helicopteros,it stated unmistakably that corporations with
substantial local presence or contacts were subject to general jurisdiction. 60
Treatises printed as black letter law that corporations were subject to general
jurisdiction wherever they engaged in a sufficiently high level of business

57 See Hoffheimer, supra
note 4, at 575-76, 578-79 (discussing the problem of the
Court's conflicting characterizations of the facts).
58 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011).
59

See id. at 2852, 2857.
60Id. at 2851. Courts and commentators reached different conclusions about whether
the place where a corporation was "at home" after Goodyear included places where it
engaged in substantial activity outside its place of incorporation or principal place of
business. The Ninth Circuit in Daimler concluded that the defendant was "at home" in
California based on its subsidiary's high level of commercial activity there. See infra notes
74-76 and accompanying text. See generally Patrick J. Borchers, J. McIntyre Machinery,
Goodyear, and the Incoherence ofthe Minimum Contacts Test, 44 CREIGHTON L. REV. 1245,
1266-67 (2011) (reading Goodyear implicitly to endorse contacts-based jurisdiction); John
N. Drobak, Personal Jurisdictionin a Global World: The Impact of the Supreme Court's
Decisions in Goodyear Dunlop Tires and Nicastro, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1707, 1722 (2013)
(reading Goodyear clearly to require more than sales or purchases in the forum state in order
to create general jurisdiction); Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 583, 592, 599 (observing that
opinion did not define the meaning of"at home" and left room to argue that test was satisfied
by continuous and systematic business activity); Peddie, supra note 27, at 698 (arguing the
Court failed to define "essentially at home") (Peddie was counsel for plaintiff in Goodyear);
Allan R. Stein, The Meaning of "Essentiallyat Home " in Goodyear Dunlop, 63 S.C. L. REV.
527, 533 (2012) (emphasizing uncertainty of meaning of corporation's home state); see also
sources cited infra note 62 (citing treatises approving contacts-based general jurisdiction
after Goodyear). But see Lindsey D. Blanchard, Goodyear and Hertz: Reconciling Two
Recent Supreme Court Decisions, 44 MCGEORGE L. REV. 865, 886 (2013); Meir Feder,
Goodyear, "Home, " and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 671, 677 (2012) (Feder was attorney for defendant in Goodyear); James R. Pielemeier,
Goodyear Dunlop: A Welcome Refinement of the Language of General Personal
Jurisdiction,16 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 969,981, 990-91 (2012) (arguing Goodyear would
or should be interpreted to restrict general jurisdiction to place of incorporation or principal
place of business). For the first argument restricting jurisdiction over corporations to the
place of incorporation and place of "systematic supervision of corporate activities," see Brief
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce I, supra note 17, at 3-4.
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activity. 6 1 Given the state of the law, Professor Yeazell's widely used textbook
added a note after Goodyear observing that it was a "wise choice" for Goodyear
USA to avoid challenging North Carolina's general jurisdiction "given the
extent of their contacts with North Carolina .... 62

61 See 36 AM. JUR. 2D Foreign Corporations§ 417 (2011); 16D C.J.S. Constitutional
Law §621753 (2005); 2 MADDEN & OWEN ON PROD. LIAB. § 29:7 (3d ed. 2000).
YEAZELL, supra note 13, at 138; see Borchers, supra note 60, at 1267 (noting
probable contacts-based jurisdiction over parent corporation in Goodyear). See generally
MARY KAY KANE, CIVIL PROCEDURE IN A NUTSHELL 60-61 (7th ed. 2013) (observing that

general jurisdiction depends on variety of fairness factors without mentioning place of
incorporation or principal place of business). But see JOSEPH W. GLANNON, CIVIL
PROCEDURE EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 6 (7th ed. 2013) (observing that general
unclear after Goodyear); MICHAEL H. HOFFHEIMER, CONFLICT OF LAWS EXAMPLES

&

jurisdiction outside a corporation's place of incorporation and principal place of business is
EXPLANATIONS 57 (2d ed. 2013) (observing that general jurisdiction over nonresident
corporation engaged in unrelated systematic commercial activity was uncertain after
Goodyear and would depend on whether the Court subsequently restricted contacts-based
jurisdiction to its principal place of business); WILLIAM M. RICHMAN ET AL.,
UNDERSTANDING CONFLICT OF LAWS 70, 112 (4th ed. 2013) (discussing uncertain status of
contacts-based general jurisdiction); Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 599 (arguing that general
jurisdiction over Goodyear USA in North Carolina was uncertain after Goodyear).
The United States suggested that contacts-based general jurisdiction over Daimler
AG's subsidiary was "debatable" after Goodyear. Brief for the United States as Amicus
Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 16 n.5, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (No.
11-965) [hereinafter Brief for the United States].
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III. THE HOLDING IN DAIMLER
A. Case History
1. District Court
In 200463 twenty-two citizens of Argentina and one citizen of Chile sued
Daimler AG 64 in California. 65 They claimed Daimler AG had collaborated with
the military dictatorship in Argentina in killing, torturing, detaining, and
kidnapping the plaintiffs and their family members during the period of
systematic human rights violations from 1976 to 1983 known as the "Dirty
War."66
63 Plaintiffs commenced the action in 2004. Bauman v. Daimlerchrysler Corp. (Bauman
1l), 579
F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 603 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir. 2010).
64
Daimler AG resulted from the reorganization of DaimlerChrysler AG, itself the result
of earlier mergers of Chrysler Corporation and Daimler-Benz AG. See Bauman v.
DaimlerChrysler AG (Bauman III), No. C-04-00194 RMW, 2005 WL 3157472, at *1 (N.D.
Cal. Nov. 22, 2005). The reorganization of the parent corporation did not affect any court's
analysis of jurisdiction over it, and we refer to it consistently as Daimler AG. Daimler AG
was a German stock company with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany. Id. But plaintiffs
contended that Daimler AG also operated an operational facility in Auburn Hills, Michigan
that constituted a headquarters in the U.S. Id
Daimler AG did not qualify to do business in California. Id. Plaintiffs attempted to
serve Daimler AG at its German headquarters under the Hague Convention, but the German
courts held that such service interfered with German sovereignty and did not authorize
service. Id The plaintiffs also attempted service on the defendant at the Michigan facility,
where employees refused to accept process. Id. at *2. They subsequently mailed service to
various addresses. Id.
Daimler AG initially challenged both sufficiency of service and personal jurisdiction
but withdrew its challenge to service. Id. Daimler AG's subsidiary, Mercedes-Benz US,
LLC, was a Delaware corporation responsible for importing and distributing Daimler AG's
cars into the U.S. Id The subsidiary was not named as a party. Personal jurisdiction over it
became relevant only to the extent its jurisdictional contacts were attributable to Daimler
AG. Id. at *6.
65 Although the court had federal question subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiffs
argued that personal jurisdiction was the same as that of California state court. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 4(k). California's statutes authorize personal jurisdiction to the extent permitted by
the Due Process Clause. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753 (citing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10
(West 2004)).
66
Bauman III, 2005 WL 3157472, at *1. The Ninth Circuit discussed the plaintiffs'
theories more fully, explaining that Daimler AG allegedly provided names of persons with
the intention that they would be killed, tortured, or removed from its workplace, thus
facilitating the end of a strike and increasing its productivity. Bauman I, 644 F.3d 909, 91112 (9th Cir. 2011), rev'd sub nom. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 746.
The plaintiffs claimed Daimler AG was liable for the torts committed by its
Argentinian subsidiary Mercedes-Benz Argentina. Id. They claimed that Daimler AG was
subject to personal jurisdiction in California through the contacts of a separate subsidiary,
Mercedes-Benz USA (MBUSA), a Delaware corporation. Id at 913-14. MBUSA had
regional and other offices in California. Id. at 914. Daimler AG sold its majority interest in
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The trial court applied the Ninth Circuit's two-part test for general
jurisdiction under which (1) a defendant must have systematic and continuous
contacts with California and (2) the assertion of general jurisdiction is
reasonable. 67 In a preliminary decision, the trial court concluded that Daimler
68
AG did not itself have systematic and continuous contacts in California and
also, though a "close question," that its subsidiary's activities should not be
69
attributed to Daimler AG for jurisdictional purposes. In 2007, after limited
discovery on whether an agency relationship existed between Daimler AG and
its subsidiary and whether plaintiffs had alternative forums in Germany or
Argentina, 70 the court dismissed for lack of personal jurisdiction due to lack of
both contacts and reasonableness.71

2. Ninth Circuit
In 2009 the Ninth Circuit initially affirmed, finding that Daimler AG lacked
continuous and systematic contacts in California without reaching the issue of
reasonableness. 72 In 2011 it reconsidered and reversed, holding that Daimler

the Chrysler car group in 2007. Id. at 913 n.7. None of the reorganizations affected the
jurisdictional analysis because: (1) contacts for general jurisdiction were determined at the
time the action was commenced, Id. at 913-14 n.7 (citing Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo
Exp. Co., 556 F.2d 406, 422 (9th Cir. 1977)); and (2) the reorganizations did not affect the
relationship between Daimler AG and MBUSA for purposes of attributing contacts of the
subsidiary to the parent. Id. at 913 n.7.
The plaintiffs stated claims under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1350
(2014), the Torture Victims Protection Act of 1991, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, and other federal,
California state, and international laws. Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler AG (Bauman IV), No.
C-04-00194 RMW, 2007 WL 486389, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 12, 2007). They brought the
case before the Supreme Court clarified that the Alien Tort Claims Act applied to U.S.
territory. See generally Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
67
Bauman III, 2005 WL 3157472, at *3 (citing Amoco Egypt Oil Co. v. Leonis
Navigation Co., Inc., 1 F.3d 848, 851 (9th Cir. 1993); Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia,
S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 415-16 (1984)).
68
Bauman III, 2005 WL 3157472, at *9.
69
Id. at *12.
70
Id. at *18-19.
71 Bauman IV, 2007 WL 486389, at *2 ("DCAG's contacts with California are not
'systematic and continuous' . . . . However, the court does not need to reach this conclusion,
as DCAG has demonstrated that both Argentina and Germany provide plaintiffs with an
adequate alternative forum for their claims, [making the exercise of general jurisdiction
unreasonable]").
72
Bauman II, 579 F.3d 1088, 1097 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 603 F.3d 1141 (9th Cir.
2010). The court refused to attribute MBUSA's contacts to Daimler AG because of
insufficient evidence of control by the parent. Id. at 1096-97.
Judge Reinhardt dissented: "The result is to shield foreign corporations from actions
in American courts-although they have structured their affairs so as to reap vast profits
from American markets-and to deprive plaintiffs, including those who allege grave human
rights abuses, of access to justice." Id. at 1098 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
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AG had both continuous and systematic contacts in California73 and that the
exercise of personal jurisdiction would be reasonable. 74 While considering
Daimler AG's direct contacts with the United States, the court rested its decision
on the contacts of its subsidiary (MBUSA) with California. 75 The Ninth
Circuit's final opinion did not cite Justice Ginsburg's recent opinion in
Goodyear. 76
73

Bauman 1, 644 F.3d 909, 931 (9th Cir. 2011) (unanimous opinion by Judge
Reinhardt, who had dissented from the court's initial decision).
74 Id. Having found sufficient contacts, the court held that the defendant bore the burden
of showing unreasonableness. Id. at 924. It found that Daimler AG's level of commercial
activity in California made it reasonable to anticipate litigation there, that the burden of
litigating in California was not too weighty, that litigation would not be more burdensome
than in Germany, that Argentina was not an adequate forum, that it was not clear whether
Germany was an adequate forum, and that the availability of alternative forums did not
prevent reasonable jurisdiction. Id at 925-29.
75
1d at 912 ("DCAG was subject to personal jurisdiction in California through the
contacts of its subsidiary .... ). MBUSA operated three offices in California. Id. at 914. No
party contested the sufficiency of its contacts for general jurisdiction. Id. at 914, 920 n. 11.
Daimler AG's direct contacts in the U.S. as a whole included a "dual operational
headquarters" in Michigan and Germany. Id. at 912-13. Daimlerchrysler sales were 1% of
the nation's gross domestic product. Id. at 913. The U.S. sales constituted 19% of MercedesBenz sales worldwide, and California sales accounted for 2.4% of Daimler AG sales
worldwide. Id at 922. Nearly 50% of Daimler AG revenue came from the U.S. Id. at 926.
The corporation employed 125,000 employees in North America and "paid $8.2 billion in
wages in the United States in 2003." Id at 926-27 n.16.
Neither the trial court nor the Ninth Circuit considered whether nationwide
jurisdiction was authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2). Id. at 918 n.9.
76 The decision was final, the panel unanimously voting to deny rehearing, and a
majority of the Circuit Judges failing to vote for rehearing en banc. Bauman v.
Daimlerchrysler Corp. (Bauman V), 676 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2011).
Judge O'Scannlain wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by seven members of the court.
Id. at 774. The dissent characterized the decision as holding that jurisdiction was proper
"based simply on having a separate U.S.-based subsidiary .... Id. at 775. It cited and quoted
Justice Ginsburg's recent opinion. Id (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)). The dissent argued that Goodyear held that foreign
subsidiaries of a U.S. parent are not amenable to general jurisdiction in the state where the
parent is subject to general jurisdiction. Id. at 776 n.1. The dissent reasoned that this
prevented any "affiliate" of a corporation from being subject to jurisdiction based on the
activity of a legally distinct corporate entity. Id. The dissent also argued more narrowly that
the majority opinion expanded jurisdiction beyond precedents and applied a test for
attributing contacts that was rejected by other Circuits. Id. at 774-75.
Justice Breyer observed that after Goodyear, the case was "crying out for an en banc
[review]." Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 54, at 30. And the Court's opinion
reveals evidence of the Court's displeasure with the Ninth Circuit's failure to apply the
standard from its recent decision in Goodyear. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753
(2014). Suggesting that the Ninth Circuit's decisionmaking was erratic, Justice Ginsburg
emphasized the posture under which the Circuit first affirmed the dismissal for lack of
jurisdiction, then changed its mind, "replac[ing its opinion] with one authored by Judge
Reinhardt, which elaborated on reasoning he initially expressed in dissent." Id. at 753. She
emphasized that Daimler AG petitioned for rehearing en banc, "urging that the exercise of
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B. Justice Ginsburg's Opinionfor the Court
The conflicting decisions by the district court and Ninth Circuit signal the
complexity of the issues. Although Goodyear clearly established that limited
sales were insufficient for general jurisdiction, it hardly addressed the situation
where a corporation's massive sales were coupled with the operation of a
subsidiary corporation that was subject to general jurisdiction (either by the
level of subsidiary's activity or by its consent).
Given that the Ninth Circuit opinion did not mention the standard
announced in Goodyear, the Court could have remanded for reconsideration. 77
It could have reversed because the exercise of jurisdiction was unreasonable or
because the Ninth Circuit's standards for unreasonableness were too lax or
erratic. Or the Court could have decided only the issue presented and decided
whether the jurisdictional contacts of the subsidiary should be attributed to the
parent.7 8
Instead, the Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that California
could not exercise general personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG. Resuming
her role as spokesperson for the Court on matters of general personal
jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg penned a strongly worded opinion that made clear
that a subsidiary's contacts would rarely be attributable to a parent corporation
and that contacts-based general jurisdiction would rarely if ever exist except in
a corporation's place of incorporation and principal place of business. Yet,
because of rhetorical fissures in the opinion, it is difficult to determine exactly
what the decision means for the future.
1. Characterizationof the Issue andRhetorical Reach of Opinion
Justice Ginsburg opened her opinion by asserting that the case "concerns
the authority of a court in the United States to entertain a claim brought by
foreign plaintiffs against a foreign defendant based on events occurring entirely
outside the United States." 79 She narrowed this broad formulation-which
could describe an issue of either subject-matter jurisdiction or personal
jurisdiction-in her statement of the issue presented: "whether the Due Process
personal jurisdiction over Daimler could not be reconciled with this Court's decision in
[Goodyear],"and she added that Daimler's petition for rehearing en banc was denied "[o]ver
the dissent of eight judges . . . ." Id.
77

Justices Breyer and Ginsburg asked whether the Court should remand on subject
matter jurisdiction grounds after Kiobel. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 54, at 3637, 45.
78 "The question presented is whether it violates due process for a court to exercise
general personal jurisdiction over a foreign corporation based solely on the fact that an
indirect corporate subsidiary performs services on behalf of the defendant in the forum
State." Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014)
(No. 11-965).
79
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 750.
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes the District Court from
exercising jurisdiction over Daimler . . . in this case, given the absence of any
California connection to the atrocities, perpetrators, or victims described in the
complaint." 80
This characterization of the case as entirely foreign foreshadowed the
outcome.8 1 Yet, as Justice Sotomayor protested in her concurrence, the Court's
statement of the question presented is far broader than the question on which the
82
Court granted certiorari and that the briefs addressed.
The expansion of the issue foreshadowed a correspondingly broad holding.
Justice Ginsburg repeatedly expresses alarm at the possibility that general
jurisdiction could reach a wholly foreign dispute. Immediately after stating the
question presented, she ridiculed the plaintiffs' position by referring to an
imaginary case that was discussed during oral argument: "So if a Mercedes Benz
vehicle overturned in Poland and injured the Polish driver and passenger, suit
for the design defect could be brought in California?" 83 The Court refused to
permit such broad general jurisdiction. "Exercises of personal jurisdiction so
exorbitant, we hold, are barred by due process constraints on the assertion of
adjudicatory authority." 84
The Court's preliminary formulations gave notice that its general
jurisdiction analysis would not focus on the defendant's activity or contacts in
the forum but on the identity of the plaintiff and the location where the
actionable conduct occurred. The preliminary summary of the holding is notable
for the absence of any reference to the corporation's contacts with the forum.
Pursuant to the Court's preliminary formulation, no "foreign" corporation can
ever be held to general jurisdiction in a state forum when the plaintiff is also
foreign and the actionable conduct occurred outside the United States.
Only in the third paragraph did the opinion explain that a foreign
corporation is subject to general jurisdiction "only when the corporation's
affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive
'as to render [it] essentially at home in the forum state.' 8 5 Under this standard,
the Court concluded that "Daimler is not 'at home' in California, and cannot be
sued there for injuries plaintiffs attribute to MB Argentina's conduct in
80

Id. at 751.
81 Alternative characterizations suggesting a different outcome are possible: Whether a
case alleging violations of international and federal laws by one of the world's largest
corporations that engages in billions of dollars of sales in California is properly brought in
California when no other forum appears to be reasonably available; or whether due process
prevents California from treating a corporation that employs a subsidiary corporation based
as a domestic corporation for purposes of general jurisdiction.
in California
82
See infra Part III.C. 1; see supra note 78.
83 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 54, at 29. Justice Ginsburg referred twice
to this hypothetical situation in her opinion. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751, 754-55 n.5.
84
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751.
85I. (alteration in original) (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)).

GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTIONAFTER DAIMLER

2015]

121

Argentina."8 6 Although the decision thus grounds its conclusion on the at-home
test, its opening paragraphs might support a reading of the opinion as an effort
to insulate foreign corporations from suit in the United States for foreign claims.
Such a reading is reinforced by Justice Ginsburg's reference to "exorbitant"
jurisdiction, inasmuch as "exorbitant jurisdiction" is a term of art in
international law for disfavored forms of jurisdiction, and by the concluding
paragraphs of the opinion, where she marshals considerations of "international
rapport" as additional reasons to reject jurisdiction in the case. 87
2. The Facts
After its preliminary summary, the Court reviewed the facts and
proceedings below, again emphasizing the international context of the case.88
The Court described the defendant, Daimler AG, as a German public stock
company with headquarters in Stuttgart, Germany, that manufactured
Mercedes-Benz cars in Germany. 89
In response to Daimler AG's motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction, the plaintiffs presented two alternative theories: first, that Daimler
AG's own contacts were sufficient to confer general jurisdiction on the
86

Id

87 Id. at 762-63. The consideration of international rapport occurs only after the Court
has concluded that jurisdiction violates due process. See infra text accompanying note 293.
This irrelevance of the issue only serves to underscore the rhetorical importance that the
Court attributed to it in signaling the Court's sensitivity to international criticisms of U.S.
practices. This was the principal interest of the United States as amicus supporting Daimler
AG. See Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 1-3.
88
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 751-52 ("The incidents recounted in the complaint center on
MB Argentina's plant in Gonzalez Catan, Argentina; no part of MB Argentina's alleged
collaboration with Argentinian authorities took place in California or anywhere else in the
United States."). The Court, perhaps significantly, did not add that none of the injured
persons were California residents.
Justice Ginsburg elsewhere criticized Justice Sotomayor for overlooking the
availability of specific jurisdiction and went so far as to write that it is "hard to conjure up
an example" of a case where eliminating general jurisdiction would lead to deep injustice.
Id at 758 n. 10. It is unclear after Daimlerwhether California can hold a corporation with a
massive presence in the state accountable for the murder of California citizens in Argentina.
Perhaps Justice Ginsburg would allow the citizenship of the plaintiffs to lead to a different
outcome. Perhaps Justice Ginsburg does not consider the denial of a forum to be a deep
injustice.
89
1d. at 752. While this is the main activity relevant to its contacts in California
established through MBUSA, it was hardly its only commercial activity. See supra note 75.
The Court did not mention that Daimler AG maintained an operational center in Michigan.
See Bauman I, 644 F.3d 909, 913 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011). Left completely out of the opinion is
the fact that Daimler AG at the time of the commencement of the action and until 2007 also
included Chrysler Car Corp., an enterprise with contacts in the United States and California
far more extensive than importing and selling Mercedes-Benz cars. See id. at 913 n.7, 926.
The plaintiffs did not challenge on appeal the trial court's holding that Daimler AG's own
contacts by themselves were insufficient for general jurisdiction. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758.
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California courts, and second, that the activities of Daimler AG's subsidiary
were sufficient to confer general jurisdiction and should be attributed to Daimler
AG. 90 The Court noted that MBUSA is a Delaware corporation with its principal
place of business in New Jersey. However, the Court also catalogued MBUSA's
"multiple California-based facilities, including a regional office in Costa Mesa,
a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center in Irvine." 9 1 The
Court noted that MBUSA is "the largest supplier of luxury vehicles to the
California market," with its sales accounting for "2.4% of Daimler's worldwide
sales." 92
Thus far, the Court relied, if selectively, on the lower courts' findings.
However, when it turned to the general distributor agreement between Daimler
AG and MBUSA, the Court departed from the Ninth Circuit's findings. 93
Whereas the Ninth Circuit examined and emphasized contractual provisions
giving Daimler AG control over MBUSA, the Court quoted only summary
language establishing MBUSA as an "independent contractor" and an
"independent business." 94 According to the Court "[t]he agreement 'does not
make [MBUSA] . . . a general or special agent, partner, joint venturer or
employee" of Daimler AG, nor does MBUSA have any "authority to make
binding obligations for or act on behalf of' Daimler AG. 95 By relying on this
language, the Court privileged the forms of corporate organization over
functional aspects of corporate activity. 96
3. A History Lesson
Nearly half the Court's opinion is devoted to a historical review of the
doctrine of general jurisdiction. The Court began by contrasting the "strict
territorial approach" of Pennoyer v. Neff and the "less rigid understanding" of
International Shoe.97 Justice Ginsburg traced the emergence of separate
categories of personal jurisdiction to International Shoe, where the Court
referred with approval to "situations where a foreign corporation's 'continuous
corporate operations within a state [are] so substantial and of such a nature as to
90

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 752.

91 Id.

92 Id
93 Id
94
95

d. (quoting General Distribution Agreement between Daimler AG and MBUSA).

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting General Distribution Agreement between Daimler
AG and MBUSA).
96 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit focused on the substance of the relationship between
the two corporations. See Bauman 1, 644 F.3d at 913-18; see also Int'l Shoe Co. v.
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 310-11 (1945) (disregarding forms of employment under which
foreign corporation styled in-state sales representatives as independent contractors).
97
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753. The Court's history overstates the purely territorial
reasoning behind Pennoyer. See infra note 51 (criticizing the Court's statement about the
purely territorial reasoning of Pennoyer).
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justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct
from those activities."' 98
After defining general jurisdiction, the Court illustrated the difference
between specific and general jurisdiction with an example discussed during oral
argument. 99 A California plaintiff injured in California by a German-made
Daimler AG product could assert a theory of specific jurisdiction because the
claim related to the sale of the product in the state.10 0 In contrast, a Polish
plaintiff injured in Poland by a Daimler AG product could not establish specific
jurisdiction in California because the claim was unrelated to California.1 01 The
defendants conceded that Daimler AG might be subject to specific jurisdiction
in the first case. 102 Justice Ginsburg was troubled that the plaintiffs claimed
general jurisdiction would reach the Polish case. 103 The Court's example
focused on the identity of the plaintiff and the foreign location of the accident,
not the nature and extent of the corporation's affiliations with California. The
Court does not provide an example of a case where both specific and general
jurisdiction would be proper. Nor does it consider an example that features only
the facts essential for general jurisdiction, such as a case where a California
resident injured in Poland sues Daimler AG in California.1 04
98

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (alteration in original) (quoting Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at
318). Justice Ginsburg's reading of InternationalShoe construes it as a foundation for a
restrictive theory of general jurisdiction that does not focus on corporate contacts or activity.
This is reflected in her insistence that the case classifies all personal jurisdiction into two
exclusive categories. But see Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 558-61 (describing Chief Justice
Stone's typology as a range of four categories of cases). It is also reflected in her failure to
address the central analytic method employed in International Shoe, where the Court
observed that "corporate personality is a fiction, although a fiction intended to be acted upon
as though it were a fact," and that such corporate presence in any state "can be manifested
only by activities carried on in its behalf by those who are authorized to act for it." Int'l Shoe,
326 U.S. at 316. For the court in 1945 presence thus symbolizes those activities that are
sufficient for jurisdiction. See id. at 316-17. The context (referring explicitly to the state of
the corporation's "origin") leaves little room for doubt that the Court historically regarded
the corporation's contacts or activities as the predicate for all forms ofjurisdiction, including
general jurisdiction over a corporation in its state of incorporation. See id.
99
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 54, at 11-14.
100 Id
101Id
102 Id
103 Id. at 29, 32.
104
In Guidi v. Inter-ContinentalHotels Corp., U.S. citizens sued a New York based
hotel for shootings at an Egyptian hotel operated by defendant. Guidi v. Inter-Continental
Hotels Corp., 224 F.3d 142, 142 (2d Cir. 2000). The Second Circuit reversed a dismissal for
forum non conveniens, recognizing the plaintiffs' need for a U.S. forum. Id It is unclear why
the hotel should obtain a different result merely by reincorporating or moving its principal
place of business to Egypt. Such a case, inasmuch as it eliminates the foreign plaintiff and
the suspicion of forum shopping, reveals the only facts essential for general jurisdiction, the
defendant's relationship to the forum. Justice Ginsburg's failure to discuss such a case is
inexplicable. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 750-63 (2014).
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Justice Ginsburg repeated the theme from Goodyear that after International
Shoe specific jurisdiction expanded to become the "centerpiece of modem
05
jurisdiction theory" while general jurisdiction has played "a reduced role."
The Court views personal jurisdiction as comprising two separate sets and
reasons that as specific jurisdiction increases, general jurisdiction must
decrease. While the expanded opportunities for specific jurisdiction have
06
reduced the number of situations where plaintiffs need general jurisdiction,1
the Court offers no explanation for why the constitutional expansion of one set
07
would require a corresponding restriction in the other.1
As in Goodyear, Justice Ginsburg's survey of general jurisdiction cases
ignored in rem actions. And she reprised her reading of leading opinions. She
labeled Perkins as the "textbook case" of general jurisdiction, 0 8 insisting that
general jurisdiction was proper because the forum state "was the corporation's
principal, if temporary, place of business." 1 09 Defending this reading becomes
105
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2854 (2011)). She stated this bluntly during oral argument: "[N]ow
that we have specific jurisdiction, so you can sue where the event occurred, just as specific
jurisdiction has expanded, so general jurisdiction has shrunk." Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 54, at 38-39.
There is nothing irrational about one student's conclusion that many of the same
reasons that supported an expansion of specific jurisdiction should also support an expansion
of general jurisdiction. See Kristina L. Angus, Note, The Demise of General Jurisdiction:
Why the Supreme Court Must Define the Parametersof GeneralJurisdiction,36 SUFFOLK
U. L. REv. 63, 80-81 (2002).
106 This is confirmed by empirical research. See Michael E. Solimine, The Quiet
Revolution in PersonalJurisdiction,73 TUL. L. REv. 1, 38 (1998) (finding that only twelve
percent of plaintiffs utilized general jurisdiction, possibly due to difficulties in succeeding
under that theory).
107 The Court noted that "[o]ur post-International Shoe opinions on general
jurisdiction . . . are few." Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 755. This observation does not begin to
explain why the Court should limit general jurisdiction.
08
1d. at 755-56 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
109Id at 756 (quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 779-80 n. 11
(1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted). Justice Ginsburg insisted that the case turned on
the fact that "[a]ll of Benguet's activities were directed by the company's president from
within Ohio." Id at 756 n.8. In response to Justice Sotomayor's interpretation of Perkins,
Justice Ginsburg displayed skepticism about any form of "doing business" general
jurisdiction. Id. (quoting Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdiction to
Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1144 (1966) (contending that
during the wartime circumstances, Ohio became "a surrogate for the place of incorporation
or head office," and Perkins "should be regarded as a decision on its exceptional facts, not
as a significant reaffirmation of obsolescing notions of general jurisdiction" based on doing
business in a forum)). Justice Ginsburg similarly insisted during oral argument that
"everything that the corporation was doing occurred in Ohio." Transcript of Oral Argument,
supra note 54, at 32.
In fact, the company had located significant assets in California and most of the
directors' meetings occurred outside Ohio. See Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 566 n.96. The
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important for limiting the effect of HelicopterosNacionales de Colombia, S.A.
v. Hall,1 10 which she interpreted as a fact-specific opinion that held that "the
company's Texas connections did not resemble the 'continuous and systematic
general business contacts . . . found to exist in Perkins."""' Justice Ginsberg
interpreted Helicopteros as establishing that purchases and related trips and
training are not enough to support general jurisdiction but she did not
acknowledge that the decision necessarily assumed the possibility of contactsbased general jurisdiction outside of a corporation's place of incorporation and
principal place of business. 112
Finally, Justice Ginsburg described Goodyear as holding that foreign tire
manufacturers were not subject to general jurisdiction in a state where only a
small percentage of tires were distributed; she explained that the manufacturers
thus lacked "any affiliation" with the state1 1 3 and were "in no sense at home"
there.11 4 Her discussion of Goodyear models the use of the new terminology
coined in that opinion. It avoids referring to contacts. 15 Instead it substitutes
language that the defendants were not "at home" in the state. 116
Having completed her survey of cases, Justice Ginsburg again contrasted
general and specific jurisdiction: "[s]pecific jurisdiction has been cut loose from
Pennoyer's sway, but we have declined to stretch general jurisdiction beyond
limits traditionally recognized."" 7 Her survey suggests that specific
jurisdiction, liberated from traditional limits, has expanded to fill most of the
jurisdictional gaps created by Pennoyer's restrictions. In contrast, general
jurisdiction remains captive in Pennoyer's corral, an archaic doctrine rarely
useful in the modem world.

more important point, made by Justice Sotomayor, was that the Court itself characterized the
mining company's activity in Ohio as a "limited[] part of its general business." Daimler, 134
S. Ct. at 768 n.7 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (quoting Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining
Co., 342 U.S. 437, 438 (1952)).
110
See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984).
111 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757 (alteration in original).
112The concurrence pointed out this revisionist history of the cases. See infra notes
152-54 and accompanying text.
11 3 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757. This characterization is tendentious. The sales established
sufficient affiliation to support specific jurisdiction over claims arising from the products
sold in the state, at least according to Justice Ginsburg. See infra note 210.
14
l Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 757 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2857 (2011)).
115 She quoted language from International Shoe that "a corporation's 'continuous
activity of some sorts within a state' is not enough to support"' general jurisdiction. Id.
(quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945)).
l6 Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851).
1l7Id. at 757-58.
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4. Analysis
The Court takes four points as givens for its analysis. First, Daimler AG is
not subject to specific jurisdiction in California. Second, Daimler AG's own
contacts with California are "too sporadic to justify the exercise of general
jurisdiction." 118 Third, MBUSA is not an alter ego of Daimler AG. Fourth,
MBUSA is subject to general jurisdiction in California.
With these propositions as its starting point, it appears that the Court is
poised to answer the question addressed by the briefs and oral arguments:
whether the Ninth Circuit's agency theory for attributing jurisdictional contacts
comports with the Due Process Clause.
a. Rejecting the Benefits Test for Attributing JurisdictionalContacts
Justice Ginsburg found that the Ninth Circuit's decision "rested primarily
on its observation that MBUSA's services were 'important' to Daimler, as
gauged by Daimler's hypothetical readiness to perform those services itself if
MBUSA did not exist." 1 1 9 She rejected the adequacy of the Ninth Circuit's test
for agency, quoting Judge Diarumid O'Scannlain's dissent to the effect that the
test will always be satisfied because the very fact that the parent corporation
assigns a task to a subsidiary indicates that it would be important enough for the
parent to perform it itself if the subsidiary did not exist. 120 For Justice Ginsburg,
the test leads to unacceptable results because it would invariably "subject
foreign corporations to general jurisdiction whenever they have an in-state
subsidiary or affiliate . . . ."121 The Ninth Circuit test gets no credit for
attempting to relate the problem of attributing jurisdictional contacts to the
underlying principle of reciprocal benefits and burdens that historically
22
grounded general jurisdiction.1

118Id. at 758.
119Id. at 759.
120
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 759-60. This reasoning rests on an appeal to intuition. Yet it
is questionable whether Daimler AG would itself perform all functions in the absence of a
subsidiary. For example, if MBUSA provides booths for dealers at California auto shows,
Daimler AG might not engage in such practices without a subsidiary. Moreover, to the extent
that Daimler AG benefits from the subsidiary's in-state activity due to increased sales, it is
uncertain why its contacts should not be attributed to the parent. Judge O'Scannlain rejected
such attribution because of a firm prior commitment to the idea of "corporate separateness."
Bauman V, 676 F.3d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 2011) (O'Scannlain, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc). The independence of the corporate fiction was, however, precisely the
issue12for decision.
1Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2856).
122 The benefit derived by the parent provides the most obvious way to measure whether
it is fair to subject the parent to general jurisdiction. And looking at the actual importance of
the subsidiary's activities prevents the attribution of contacts when the activities are trivial
and not beneficial to the parent. It is enough for the Court that the test is too easily satisfied:
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b. Rejecting Contacts-BasedGeneralJurisdictionover DaimlerAG
In rejecting the Ninth Circuit's agency theory for attributing contacts, the
Court answered the question on which it accepted certiorari. But Justice
Ginsburg went further, declaring:
Even if we were to assume that MBUSA is at home in California, and further
to assume MBUSA's contacts are imputable to Daimler, there would still be
no basis to subject Daimler to general jurisdiction in California, for Daimler's
slim contacts with the State hardly render it at home there. 12 3
Justice Ginsburg devotes the fewest words to the most far-reaching part of
her decision. Her opening sentence appears to state a paradox inasmuch as her
givens included the fact that MBUSA was subject to general jurisdiction in
California. Hence, if the subsidiary's contacts were imputed to the parent, it
logically would seem to require that the parent, too, would have sufficient
contacts. 124 Although she might have been clearer, she evidently did not find
that logic requires this result for three separate reasons. First,-the subsidiary's
jurisdiction is only "at home" by stipulation, and this stipulation need not imply
that it has sufficient contacts for general jurisdiction. 125 Second, Justice
Ginsburg does not accept that general jurisdiction over any party is established
by sufficient contacts. Third, she insists that the parent's relationship to the state
must be evaluated separately from that of its subsidiaries, and the evaluation of
the parent will involve a consideration of its activity outside the forum.
Justice Ginsburg's declaration that general jurisdiction over Daimler AG
would not exist even counting MBUSA's in-state contacts makes clear that instate contacts are no longer the essential ingredient of general jurisdiction. To
say that Daimler AG would not be "at home" in California even with MBUSA's
contacts means that something other than contacts defines what it means that to
be "at home" in a state. Her subsequent discussion of whether Daimler AG is
"at home" in California lends credence to this distinction. She reads Goodyear,
Justice Ginsburg rejected it with the observation that it "would sweep beyond even the
'sprawling view of general jurisdiction' we rejected in Goodyear."Id
The jurisdictional problem in Daimler was the opposite of the one in Goodyear,
where the parent conceded it was subject to personal jurisdiction and the only issue was
whether the limited sales of its European subsidiaries were sufficient for general jurisdiction

over them. See id at 750-51. While the parent corporation facilitated the distribution of some
of the subsidiaries' products, its other substantial activity in no way benefited the European
affiliates. Id In contrast, the subsidiary's activity in California directly and materially
benefited Daimler AG. Id
123Id at 760.
124 Plaintiff's counsel appears to have made this logical argument. Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 54, at 40.
125 There was no formal stipulation, but in arguing the issues of jurisdiction, no party
contested the sufficiency of the subsidiary's contacts for general jurisdiction. See supra notes
74-76. The United States observed in its amicus brief that MBUSA might not be subject to
general jurisdiction after Goodyear. Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 13-14, 17.
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which introduced the "essentially at home" test, as holding "that only a limited
set of affiliations with a forum will render a defendant amenable to all-purpose
jurisdiction there."' 26
She repeated her claim from Goodyear that the "paradigm forum" for
general jurisdiction over individuals is their place of domicile,1 27 and the
"paradigm fora" for corporations are their places of incorporation and principal
places of business. 128 She reasoned that limiting general jurisdiction to a limited
number of places is beneficial because they are "unique," indicating "only one
place." For the first time, she also argued that the restriction is desirable because
these places are "easily ascertainable." 29 For this latter proposition, she cited
Hertz Corp. v. Friend,130 where the Court had adopted a bright-line test for the
"principal place of business" in the diversity statute.131 She asserted that "[t]hese
bases afford plaintiffs recourse to at least one clear and certain forum in which
a corporate defendant may be sued on any and all claims."1 32 Eliminating
general jurisdiction elsewhere leaves a "nice clear rule" that personal
jurisdiction over a corporation exists in only two places, no matter what its
subsidiaries do.1 33
126 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 (citing Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54).
27
1

Id. (citing Lea Brilmayer et al., A General Look at GeneralJurisdiction,66 TEX. L.
REv. 721, 728 (1988)). It was never explained why domicile rather than presence provided
the "paradigm" for individuals. As a practical matter, jurisdiction based on presence is almost
certainly invoked far more frequently than domicile, though it may be hard to find an
empirical study supporting this claim.
128
Id.; cf Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2853-54.
1 2 9 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
130 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 77-78 (2010).
131 See infra note 226 (questioning the relevance of a prudential construction of language
in the diversity statute as authority for imposing due process limits on state personal
jurisdiction).
132
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760. The certainty ofjurisdiction in two places obviously does
not explain why other places cannot have jurisdiction as well.
One of the scholars cited by the Court who questioned the continuing utility of
general jurisdiction had suggested that if the courts embraced her proposal for expansive
specific jurisdiction (which they have not), then "they will not need to use general
jurisdiction to reach tenuously related cases. They may then opt to limit the scope of general
jurisdiction to a set of clearly defined circumstances in order to provide certainty and
administrative efficiency, or they may choose to use the broader 'fair-for-any-claim' test to
explore the limits of the constitutional power to exercise dispute-blind jurisdiction over
nonresidents." Twitchell, supra note 8, at 681. The article neither proposed eliminating
jurisdiction for residents nor urged that administrative efficiency provide constitutional
limits on state power.
133 See Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the
Petitioner at 9, Daimler, 134 S. Ct 746 (No. 11-965) [hereinafter Brief of the U.S. Chamber
of Commerce II] ("Read together [the precedents] establish a clear and predictable rule:
Corporations are subject to general jurisdiction only in their state of incorporation and
principal place of business."). Justice Ginsburg cited this brief as matter in the record
authorizing the Court to address issues not described in the petition for writ of certiorari.
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760 n.16. Justice Ginsburg also cited the amicus brief of Professor
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c. The PossibilityofExceptional Cases
The Court's opinion does not formally preclude jurisdiction over
corporations outside the paradigm states of incorporation and place of business.
Justice Ginsberg conceded that "Goodyear did not hold that a corporation may
be subject to general jurisdiction only in a forum where it is incorporated or has
its principal place of business . . . ."134 At the same time, she rejected the theory
that a corporation is subject to general jurisdiction "in every State in which [it]
35
'engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business."'
Such broad jurisdiction is "unacceptably grasping."l 36
The Court did not offer reasons or policies to support its key conclusion. It
thus remains unclear why a corporation like Daimler AG, with U.S. sales equal
to 1% of Germany's(?) GDP,1 37 should not be subject to jurisdiction in every
state where it has continuous and systematic contacts, even if that means it
becomes subject to jurisdiction in all fifty states. The only explanation Justice
Ginsburg offered is that allowing "exorbitant" general jurisdiction in all states
"would scarcely permit out-of-state defendants 'to structure their primary
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will
not render them liable to suit.' 1

38

But this explanation does not address the fact

that Daimler AG and comparable corporations had already structured their
commercial activity so as to derive considerable revenue from California sales
with the full expectation of possible general jurisdiction based on preexisting
circuit authority.

Lea Brilmayer as raising this matter. Id. (citing Brief of Amica Curiae Professor Lea
Brilmayer Supporting Petitioner at 10-12, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965) [hereinafter
Brief of Professor Lea Brilmayer]). Professor Brilmayer seems, however, to have actually
endorsed the contacts-based approach applied by the Ninth Circuit and rejected by the Court.

See Brief of Professor Lea Brilmayer, supra, at 10 ("To establish general jurisdiction,
plaintiffs must show "continuous and systematic' contacts between each defendant and the
forum.").
Justice Alito asked during argument, "[W]hy shouldn't the rule be that, unless a
corporation is incorporated in the jurisdiction or has its principal place of business in the
jurisdiction, . . . the acts of the subsidiary are not attributable, unless it's an alter ego[?] It's
a nice, clean rule." Transcript of Oral Argument, supranote 54, at 47-48. Only the possibility
of exceptional cases prevents the Court from adopting this rule formally.
134 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760.
135Id at 761 (citing Brief for Respondents at 16-17 & nn. 7-8, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746
(No. 11-965)).

136 1d. Justice Kagan had similarly observed during argument, "If [Daimler AG] were
subject to general jurisdiction in California, so, too, it would be subject to general jurisdiction
in every State in the United States, and all of that has got to be wrong." Transcript of Oral
Argument, supra note 54, at 31.
137
Bauman I, 644 F.3d 909, 912-13 (9th Cir. 2011). The Ninth Circuit fails to make
clear whether it is referring to the GDP of Germany or the United States.
138
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761-62 (2014) (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471
U.S. 461, 472 (1985)).
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In sum, Justice Ginsburg took pains to emphasize that the place of
incorporation and principal place of business are the "exemplar" places of
general jurisdiction.1 39 Though conceding that general jurisdiction might not be
limited to those places and that "continuous and systematic" affiliations might
also establish general jurisdiction,1 4 0 she qualified this concession in a footnote:
"We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case . . . a

corporation's operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation
or principal place of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to
render the corporation at home in that State." 4 1
Three points about this footnote are important. First, not foreclosing a
possibility is not the same as saying it exists. 142 Second, the only authority
mentioned supporting exceptional contacts-based general jurisdiction is a case
Justice Ginsburg insists in another footnote was actually brought in the
company's principal place of business. Third, Justice Ginsburg suggested no
examples of cases that might support contacts-based general jurisdiction, though
she insisted Daimler AG's activities in California "plainly do not approach that
level."1 43
C. Justice Sotomayor's Concurrence
Justice Sotomayor wrote a separate opinion, concurring in the judgment. In
her view, California cannot exercise general jurisdiction over Daimler AG,
because doing so would be so unreasonable that it would violate due process "in
light of the unique circumstances of this case." 1 44 Justice Sotomayor differed
with the majority on two points. First, she pointed out that the majority opinion
goes beyond the question that the Court accepted for review. 145 Second, she
rejected the majority's repudiation of contacts-based general jurisdiction. 146
1. The Controversy over the Issue Presented
Justice Sotomayor objected to the Court's reaching the issue of the
sufficiency of contacts to support general jurisdiction. Doing so removed the
139Id. at 760 (refusing under the facts to look beyond "exemplar bases" of general
jurisdiction in place of incorporation and principal place of business).
140Id. at 761 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct.
2846,2851(2011)).
141Id. at 761 n. 19 (citation omitted).
142 The tentative acceptance of a possibility is a remarkable retreat from Goodyear. It
signals the possible rejection of all contacts-based general jurisdiction, which may be a view
embraced by members of the Court joining the opinion. See infra note 174 (discussing many
Justices' rejection of the burdens and fairness factors in personal jurisdiction).
143
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.19.
144Id. at 763 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
14 5
See id. at 764.
146
See id
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47
issue from the appropriate consideration of the courts below,1 and the Court
14 8
Moreover, because the
was denied the benefit of briefing on the issue.
defendant did not argue contacts were insufficient, it did not develop a factual
49
While the record indicated the
record appropriate for judicial review.1
1 50
the record did not disclose other
presence of significant sales-related contacts,
information relevant to general jurisdiction such as the location of key files and
the responsibility of employees in California.151

2. MisreadingPrecedent
Justice Sotomayor recognized that the contacts-based test for general
jurisdiction derived from InternationalShoe and had been approved repeatedly
152
by the Court in prior decisions.
Our cases have long stated the rule that a defendant's contacts with a forum
State must be continuous, substantial, and systematic in order for the defendant
to be subject to that State's general jurisdiction. We offered additional guidance
in Goodyear, adding the phrase "essentially at home" to our prior formulation
of the rule. We used the phrase "at home" to signify that in order for an out-ofstate defendant to be subject to general jurisdiction, its continuous and

1 47 Id. (observing that the ground of decision was "neither argued nor passed on [by the
courts] below .... ).
148 The issue was raised for the first time in a footnote to Daimler AG's brief. Id (citing
Brief for Petitioner at 31-32 n.5, Daimler, 134 S. Ct. 746 (No. 11-965)). Not even the most
aggressive arguments in the briefs urged a rejection of contacts-based general jurisdiction.
Cf Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce II, supra note 133, at 6.
1 49 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 766 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("The relevant facts are
undeveloped because Daimler conceded at the start of this litigation that MBUSA is subject
to general jurisdiction based on its California contacts. We therefore do not know the full
extent of those contacts, though what little we do know suggests that Daimler was wise to
concede what it did.").
150
Daimler AG's U.S. subsidiary operated a regional headquarters and multiple offices
in California. Id at 767. The record does not contain clear information about the volume of
U.S. and California sales of products manufactured in the U.S. by Daimler AG affiliates, but
it supports the conclusion that many of the more than 200,000 Daimler AG vehicles imported
into the U.S. were sold in California, and that the total annual sales in California reached
$4.6 billion, which accounted for 2.4% of Daimler AG's worldwide sales. Id at 766-67.
1 5 1 Id. at 767. Justice Sotomayor observed that the Court found general jurisdiction in
Perkins based on facts that might have been present in Daimler but that are not known
because of the record. Id. (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 44748 (1952) (permitting general jurisdiction based on defendant's maintaining an office in the
state, keeping files, and overseeing company activity from the state)).
152
See id. "Until today, our precedents had established a straightforward test for general
jurisdiction: Does the defendant have 'continuous corporate operations within a state' that
are 'so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising
from dealings entirely distinct from those activities?"' Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945); Helicopteros Nacionales de
Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984)).
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substantial contacts with a forum State must be akin to those of a local
enterprise that actually is "at home" in the State. 153
Furthermore, Justice Sotomayor insisted that prior decisions had focused on
the relationship of the defendant with the forum state: "In every case where we
have applied this test, we have focused solely on the magnitude of the
defendant's in-state contacts, not the relative magnitude of those contacts in
comparison to the defendant's contacts with other States."l 54 After reviewing
the treatment of the facts in the leading general jurisdiction decisions, she
concluded that the Court's steady focus on in-state contacts "follows from the
touchstone principle of due process in this field, the concept of reciprocal
fairness." 55 Justice Sotomayor explained: "When a corporation chooses to
invoke the benefits and protections of a State in which it operates, the State
acquires the authority to subject the company to suit in its courts."1 56
Justice Sotomayor's view that reciprocal fairness supports jurisdiction in a
specific state because of the defendant's relationship with that state makes the
defendant's out-of-state activity irrelevant. She saw Justice Ginsburg's attention
to out-of-forum contacts as a new approach that is "untethered" from the Court's
historic focus on relationship with the forum.1 57 And Justice Sotomayor viewed
it as promoting undesirable results: "After all, the degree to which a company
intentionally benefits from a forum State depends on its interactions with that
State, not its interactions elsewhere." 58
Under the Court's precedents and its "settled approach," Justice Sotomayor
found "little trouble" in concluding that Daimler AG had sufficient contacts with
California so as to render it "at home" and subject to general jurisdiction in the
state.1 59

153Id. at 769 (citation omitted).
154Id at 767.
1 55 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 768.
1 56 Id. (citing Int'lShoe, 326 U.S. at 319; J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct.
2780, 2796-97 (2011) (plurality opinion)).
1 57 Id. at 768-69.
158I. She cited and quoted a law review article elsewhere cited by the majority that
supports the conclusion that out-of-state contacts should not prevent jurisdiction. Id. at 769
(citing Brilmayer et al., supra note 127, at 742). The author of the article submitted an amicus
brief in support of Daimler AG but did not address the issue of contacts-based general
jurisdiction as the litigants did not understand the issue to be before the Court. See Brief of
Professor Lea Brilmayer, supra note 133.
1 59 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 769 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). For Justice Sotomayor this
conclusion is unavoidable given Daimler AG's concessions that its subsidiary is subject to
general jurisdiction in the forum state and the Court's concession that its subsidiary's
contacts may be attributable to it. Id. at 769-70.
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3. "At Home" Can Be Many Places
Justice Sotomayor, who had joined the Court's unanimous opinion in
160
Goodyear, saw that opinion as endorsing contacts-based general jurisdiction.
She challenged Justice Ginsburg's reading of the "essentially at home"
metaphor from Goodyear as an effort to restrict jurisdiction and to require a
consideration of out-of-state contacts.1 6 1 For Justice Sotomayor, such a
restrictive reading was inconsistent with the Court's general jurisdiction
cases.1 62

Justice Sotomayor squarely faced the prospect that alarmed the majority:
the possibility that a large corporation could be subject to general jurisdiction in
every state. She dismissed the majority's concern that permitting such broad
163 She regarded
general jurisdiction would render jurisdiction unpredictable.
64
broad jurisdiction as the "inevitable consequence" of the global economy,1
and pointed out that any unfairness or inconvenience resulting from broad
contacts-based general jurisdiction could be ameliorated by the reasonableness
requirement for personal jurisdiction or doctrines such as forum non conveniens,
change of venue, and long-arm statutes. 16 5
160

See supra text accompanying note 153 (quoting Justice Sotomayor's concurring
opinion and explanation of "at home" as paraphrase for sufficient contacts).
161 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 769 n.8 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Competing views of the
"essentially at home" test led to a sharp exchange about the facts in Perkins, the "textbook
case" of general jurisdiction. Justice Sotomayor insisted that the majority's comparative
approach cannot be a correct application of the "at home" requirement given that the Court
approved of general jurisdiction in Perkins. According to her, the company's in-state
operations in that case were only a part of its business, yet the Court relied exclusively on
the in-state contacts in finding general jurisdiction. Id (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (citing
Perkins, 342 U.S. at 438 (finding general jurisdiction where company carried on a
"continuous and systematic, but limited, part of its general business")).
In contrast, Justice Ginsburg insisted Perkins applied an implicit comparative
analysis and relied on the fact that the company was not operating outside the forum state.
She saw the facts as showing that the defendant established its principal place of business in
Ohio. See supra notes 108-09 and accompanying text. Justice Ginsburg's characterization
of the facts simultaneously supports a restrictive, comparative approach to general
jurisdiction and avoids any theoretical commitment to contacts-based jurisdiction outside the
principal place of business.
162 None of its earlier decisions finding lack of general jurisdiction did so simply because
the defendants were sued outside their place of incorporation or principal place of business.
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 770 n.9 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
163
Id. at 770 ("But there is nothing unpredictable about a rule that instructs multinational
corporations that if they engage in continuous and substantial contacts with more than one
State, they will be subject to general jurisdiction in each one.").
1 64 Id. at 771 ("In the era of InternationalShoe, it was rare for a corporation to have such
substantial nationwide contacts that it would be subject to general jurisdiction in a large
number of States. Today, that circumstance is less rare. . . . [I]t is fair to say today that a
multinational conglomerate can enjoy such extensive benefits in multiple forum States that
it is 'essentially at home' in each one.").
165 Id
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4. Injustice of the Majority's Approach
Justice Sotomayor pointed to four "deep injustice[s]" resulting from the
majority's approach. 166 First, the restriction of general jurisdiction interferes
with state sovereignty. To the extent that a company has the requisite contacts
with a state, that state should be able to adjudicate disputes against that
company. She gave the example of "a company [that] divides its management
functions equally among three offices in different States, with one office
nominally deemed the company's corporate headquarters."l 67 Under the
majority's holding, only the state in which the nominal headquarters is located
can exercise general jurisdiction even if the company's activities in the other
states are more substantial.1 68
Second, the majority's comparative approach to evaluating contacts
discriminates against small and local businesses. "Whereas a larger company
will often be immunized from general jurisdiction in a State on account of its
extensive contacts outside the forum, a small business will not be." 69
Third, the majority's formal rules are inconsistent with the evolving law
governing general jurisdiction over individuals. Pursuant to Burnham v.
Superior Court, a state can exercise general jurisdiction over an individual on
the basis of a "one-time visit," regardless of that individual's comparative
contacts with other states. 170 But, after Daimler, a corporation cannot be held to
general jurisdiction in a forum in which it "owns property, employs workers,
and does billions of dollars' worth of business" without a comparative analysis
of its contacts elsewhere. 17 1
Fourth, "the ultimate effect of the majority's approach will be to shift the
risk of loss from multinational corporations to the individuals harmed by their
actions." 72 While the majority expressed little concern for foreign plaintiffs
suing a foreign defendant for foreign conduct, Justice Sotomayor observed that
its decision reached farther. She provided examples of cases where the majority
opinion appears to preclude jurisdiction over claims by U.S. plaintiffs in
appropriate state courts.1 73
166Id. at 772.
167 Id.
168
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772.
169 Id.
1 70 Id. at 772-73 (citing Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (Scalia, J.)).
171Id. at 773.

172Id

173 First, she noted that contact-based jurisdiction will be unavailable to U.S. businesses
in actions against foreign corporations with substantial business presence in the U.S. when
the claims arise outside the U.S. "[A] U.S. business that enters into a contract in a foreign
country to sell its products to a multinational company there may be unable to seek relief in
any U.S. court . . . even if that company has considerable operations in numerous U.S.
forums." Id Second, contacts-based general jurisdiction would be unavailable to a U.S.
plaintiff suing a U.S. company in a U.S. forum for claims arising in another state: "a General
Motors autoworker who retires to Florida would be unable to sue GM in that State for
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5. Alternative Basisfor Decision
Despite the presence of continuous and systematic contacts, Justice
Sotomayor concurred in the legal conclusion that forcing Daimler AG to submit
to personal jurisdiction in California would violate the defendant's due process
rights. She applied the two-part analysis elaborated by the Court in specific
jurisdiction cases, 174 embraced by most lower courts, 175 and applied by the
Ninth Circuit in the proceedings below.1 76 Under this test, (1) a defendant must
have sufficient contacts with the forum state, and (2) the exercise of personal
jurisdiction must not be unfair or unreasonable. Asahi Metal Industries provided
Justice Sotomayor with an example of disposing of a jurisdictional challenge on
the test's second prong.1 77
Similarly, Justice Sotomayor concluded that due process prohibits the
exercise of personal jurisdiction over Daimler AG under the facts of the case:
The same considerations resolve this case. It involves Argentine plaintiffs
suing a German defendant for conduct that took place in Argentina. Like the
plaintiffs in Asahi, [plaintiffs] have failed to show that it would be more
convenient to litigate in California than in Germany, a sovereign with a far
greater interest in resolving the dispute. Asahi thus makes clear that it would
be unreasonable for a court in California to subject Daimler to its
jurisdiction. 178
disabilities that develop from the retiree's labor at a Michigan parts plant, even though GM
undertakes considerable business operations in Florida." Id. at 773 n.12. Finally, a U.S.
tourist whose child is injured in a foreign hotel owned by a multinational corporation would
be unable to sue the foreign corporation in any U.S. state, even if the foreign corporation
"has a massive presence in multiple States." Id. at 773. This example is discussed by
Twitchell, supra note 8, at 670-71.
174 See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). While the Supreme Court
had developed the two-part test in specific jurisdiction cases, before Daimlerthe Court never
clearly limited the test to specific jurisdiction analysis. A number of Justices have become
vocally critical of any legal standards requiring a judicial evaluation of burdens and faimess.
See Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604 (1990) (Scalia, J.); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011) (Kennedy, J.).
175 Although the majority objected that general jurisdiction does not encompass a
reasonableness prong, Justice Sotomayor responded that "[t]he Courts of Appeals have
uniformly held that the reasonableness prong does in fact apply in the general jurisdiction
context." Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 n.1 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Sotomayor
correctly noted that her own reasoning rested on a ground not briefed or argued below,
stating, "I would decide this case under the reasonableness prong without foreclosing future
consideration of whether that prong should be limited to the specific jurisdiction context."
Id. at 765.
176
Bauman I, 644 F.3d 909, 912 (9th Cir. 2011). Before Daimler, even legal scholars
proposing restrictions on general jurisdiction approved of the reasonableness test. E.g., B.
Glenn George, In Search of GeneralJurisdiction,64 TUL. L. REv. 1097, 1129, 1131 (1990).
1 77 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 765 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (discussing Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987)).
1 7 8 Id
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Justice Sotomayor's opinion closes by emphasizing her disagreement with
the majority.1 79

IV.

REMAINING UNCERTAINTIES

Justice Ginsburg's opinion offers a number of reasons in support of its
holding, from the administrative convenience of the rule to its empowerment of
corporate planning and liability avoidance. The exact scope of the holding and
the relative importance of the values supporting it create a number of
uncertainties about its application in future cases. This part identifies and
discusses some of the legal issues that will become the focus of future litigation.
A. Service on Agent Appointed to Receive Service ofProcess
In the age of Pennoyer, service on in-state agents established valid general
jurisdiction either because the appointment signified the nonresident
defendant's presence in the state's territory or because the appointment
constituted consent to jurisdiction. 8 0 InternationalShoe put an end to presencebased arguments that service on an agent automatically established
jurisdiction.' 8 1 International Shoe replaced the search for presence and
constructive consent with a functional analysis of the nonresident's activity in
the forum state. As the Court now understands that decision, specific jurisdiction
required only minimum contacts regardless of the method of service. 182 In
contrast, general jurisdiction required a higher level of activity, which the
majority now characterizes (for corporations) as requiring that the corporation
be "at home" in the state. 183 Appointing an agent obviously does not constitute
making a legal home in the forum state so as to support general jurisdiction.

1 79 1d. at 773.
The Court rules against [plaintiffs] today on a ground that no court has considered in
the history of this case, that this Court did not grant certiorari to decide, and that Daimler
raised only in a footnote of its brief. In doing so, the Court adopts a new rule of
constitutional law that is unmoored from decades of precedent.

Id.
1 80 See supra Part II.B.
181 Dean Perdue traces the evolution of the Court's personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
from a focus on the sovereignty consequences of exercising personal jurisdiction to a focus
on the liberty interests of defendants. In this process, she argues the Court construed due
process limits as substantive criteria. Wendy Collins Perdue, What's "Sovereignty" Got to
Do with It? Due Process, PersonalJurisdiction,and the Supreme Court, 63 S.C. L. REv.
730-39 (2012).
729, 182
See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
183 See supra text accompanying note 16; see also Rhodes, supra note 38, at 861. The
courts originally understood such a substantial level of activity very differently. It was meant
to contrast not with minimum contacts but rather with such an occasional or transient level
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But InternationalShoe did not address consent theories ofjurisdiction. And

it remains uncertain whether appointment of an agent for purposes of service of
process can constitute effective consent to either specific or general jurisdiction
that dispenses with the need for any further affiliation with the state. 184 The
consent theory for service on an agent is controversial. 185 Lower courts are
divided over this issue, 186 and the Supreme Court has expressed keen interest in
it. 18 7

The Court's recent decisions provide no clear guidance. Their emphasis on
history, certainty, and corporate control might support the continued validity of
service on agents appointed to receive process,' 8 8 and appointing an agent might
of activity that the corporation would not be deemed present. See supra text accompanying
note 45.
184
E.g., Nat'l Equip. Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311, 315-16 (1964) ("[I]t is
settled ... that parties to a contract may agree in advance to submit to the jurisdiction of a
given court. . . .").
185 Scholars have challenged the sufficiency of consent to validate jurisdiction resulting
from service on an agent appointed to accept service. See Carol Andrews, Another Look at
GeneralPersonalJurisdiction,47 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 999, 1066 (2012) ("I contend that
neither 'doing business' nor registration, by itself, confers general jurisdiction. General
jurisdiction is limited to the one or two states in which the corporation is at home.");
Brilmayer et al., supra note 127, at 757-58; Alfred Hill, Choice ofLaw and Jurisdictionin
the Supreme Court, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 960, 981 (1981); Matthew Kipp, InferringExpress
Consent: The ParadoxofPermittingRegistrationStatutes to Confer GeneralJurisdiction,9
REv. LITIG. 1, 3-4 (1990); D. Craig Lewis, Jurisdictionover Foreign CorporationsBased
on RegistrationandAppointment of an Agent: An UnconstitutionalCondition Perpetuated,
15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 1 (1990); Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, supra note 27, at 444 ("This

method of obtaining jurisdiction is thus ripe for invalidation by the Supreme Court."); Lee
Scott Taylor, Note, Registration Statutes, Personal Jurisdiction, and the Problem of

Predictability, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 1163, 1163 (2003) (suggesting that general jurisdiction
should be unconstitutional under a due process analysis that focuses on predictability and
arguing that "even if the Due Process Clause does not prohibit general jurisdiction through
registration statutes, the unpredictability they introduce invalidates the consent theory upon
which this species of personal jurisdiction is premised."); see also Eric A. Chiappinelli, The
Myth of Director Consent: After Shaffer, Beyond Nicastro, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 783, 785
(2013) (arguing Delaware statute subjecting directors of Delaware corporations to specific
jurisdiction violates due process and cannot be sustained under a consent theory). But see
Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 18, at 258-63 (arguing that plaintiffs may succeed in
avoiding effects of Daimler by asserting that corporation's registration to do business
constitutes consent to general jurisdiction).
186 Compare Wenche Siemer v. Learjet Acquisition Corp., 966 F.2d 179, 183-84 (5th
Cir. 1992) (holding that appointment of agent does not establish consent to general
jurisdiction), with Knowlton v. Allied Van Lines, Inc., 900 F.2d 1196, 1200 (8th Cir. 1990)
(holding that appointment establishes valid consent to general jurisdiction). See generally
Rhodes, supra note 27, at 441 n.328 (collecting cases).
187 See Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 600-01 (discussing Justice Ginsburg's colloquy
during oral argument in Goodyear).
188
See id. at 601. But see Rhodes, supra note 27, at 436-41 (arguing that early cases
provide no unambiguous support for such jurisdiction and that the consent decisions are
linked to discredited territorial assumptions).
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satisfy the volitional-submission theory of jurisdiction embraced by a minority
of the Court. 189 But consent and service on agents are conspicuously absent
from Justice Ginsburg's historical narrative. Moreover, the recent decision
makes plain that doing business, the prerequisite for registering, is itself
insufficient for general jurisdiction, 190 and Justice Ginsburg suggested that older
decisions upholding general jurisdiction based on service on local agents have
been effectively overruled by the Court's modem, functional approach.191 The
cases she questioned did not distinguish sharply between agents appointed
specifically to receive service and local agents that were invested with such
authority by operation of law. 192
Even if serving agents supports general jurisdiction, Daimler does not offer
states the means to reach large foreign corporations like Daimler AG. Such
corporations accomplish in-state objectives through intermediaries and thus
avoid appointing agents for service of process. In contrast, the consent theory
might support jurisdiction over those corporations and subsidiaries that can be
effectively coerced into appointing agents as a condition for obtaining licenses,
qualifying as a party, or obtaining other legal benefits.1 93

B. The Scope of the Opinion in Daimler
Daimler presented unusual facts. The claims were brought by foreign
nationals against a foreign corporation for claims that arose entirely outside the
United States. The defendant's contacts with California were mostly related to
sales of products to consumers, and it marketed those products through
intermediaries. The defendant did not do most of its business in the United

18 9 See infra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing submission theory).

1 90 See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 n.20 (2014).
91Id at 761 n.18 (discussing plaintiffs' counsel's citations to Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane,
170 U.S. 100 (1898) and Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 115 N.E. 915 (N.Y. 1917)
(Cardozo, J.) (both holding that general jurisdiction was proper over nonresident defendant
with local office in state)). Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that the Court had cited Tauza in
InternationalShoe, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945), and again cited Tauza and Barrow in Perkins,
342 U.S. 437, 446 & 446 n.6 (1952). She cautioned: "[The] unadorned citations to these
cases, both decided in the era dominated by Pennoyer'sterritorial thinking should not attract
heavy reliance today." Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 n.18 (citation omitted). She added a see
generally cite to a scholar who questioned whether doing business continues to provide a
valid basis for general jurisdiction. Id. (quoting Meir Feder, Goodyear, "Home, " and the
UncertainFuture ofDoing Business Jurisdiction,63 S.C. L. REv. 671 (2012)).

1 92 See Tauza, 115 N.E. at 918 (citing Barrow, 170 U.S. 100) (observing that jurisdiction
results from service on a managing agent with "equal force" as service on agent appointed
to receive process).
19 3 Denying nonresident corporations some legal benefits is unconstitutional. Cf Bendix
Autolite Corp. v. Widwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 889 (1988) (holding tolling statute
of limitation in claims against foreign corporation that did not appoint agent for service in
state violated Commerce Clause).
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States, and neither it nor its subsidiary did most of their U.S. business in
California.1 94

Nevertheless, the opinion in Daimler leaves little room for arguing that the
holding should be limited to its unusual facts. The Court reached beyond the
issues required to resolve the appeal to address contacts-based general
jurisdiction. Justice Ginsburg insisted on an expansive rereading of the "at
home" language in Goodyear and concluded that the corporate activity in
Daimler did not support general jurisdiction. As one influential source
summarizes the opinion, "[o]utside of 'an exceptional case,' the Court ruled,
general jurisdiction will generally be limited to the places where a corporation
is incorporated and [maintains] its principal place of business." 95
194 The record does not even support a finding that a plurality of its products were sold
in California. See supra note 75.
195 William Baude, Opinion Recap: A Stricter View of General Jurisdiction,
SCOTUSBLOG (Jan. 15, 2014, 11:30 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/01/opinionrecap-a-stricter-view-of-general-jurisdiction/,
archived at http://perma.cc/555G-J2A8.
Relying on Daimler, Circuits have quickly concluded that defendants with more extensive
contacts outside a state were not "at home" in the forum. See Monkton Ins. Servs., Ltd. v.
Ritter, 768 F.3d 429, 432 (5th Cir. 2014) (no general jurisdiction over Cayman Islands
defendant in Texas when plaintiff failed to show its contacts are "continuous and systematic"
enough to render it "at home" in forum); Gucci Am., Inc. v. Weixing Li, 768 F.3d 122, 135
(2d Cir. 2014) (no general jurisdiction over Chinese defendant in N.Y. because this is not
the "exceptional case" in which defendant's "continuous and systematic contacts" rise to the
level of being "at home" in forum); Sonera Holding B.V. v. Cukurova Holding A.S., 750
F.3d 221, 226 (2d Cir. 2014) (no general jurisdiction over Turkish corporation in N.Y.
because even "a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business . . . fall[s] short
of [the contacts] required to render it at home" in the forum); In re Roman Catholic Diocese
of Albany, 745 F.3d 30, 40 (2d Cir. 2014) (no general jurisdiction over N.Y. defendant in
Vermont because defendant's contacts were insufficient to render it "at home" in forum);
Martinez v. Aero Caribbean, 764 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2014) (no general jurisdiction
because defendant's forum contacts "are minor compared to its other worldwide contacts").
Federal trial court opinions may suggest a growing impatience with all contactsbased analyses. In some cases where a corporation is not incorporated and does not have its
principal place of business in the forum, the courts apply a functional presumption against
jurisdiction, placing the burden on the plaintiff to show an "exceptional case" for jurisdiction
over and above showing "substantial, continuous, and systematic" contacts. See, e.g.,
HealthSpot, Inc. v. Computerized Screening, Inc., No. 1: 14-CV-00804, 2014 WL 6896298,
at *4 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 8, 2014) (no general jurisdiction over Nevada corporation because
Ohio "is not a 'paradigm all-purpose forum[]' as defined by the Supreme Court" and plaintiff
has not "sufficiently shown this to be an 'exceptional case' in which general jurisdiction
would nonetheless be proper"); Locke v. Ethicon Inc., No. 4:14-CV-2648, 2014 WL
5819824, at *4-7 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2014) (no general jurisdiction over N.J. defendants in
Texas where plaintiffs failed to show that this was "an exceptional case" despite showing
that defendants' Texas revenues were $18,697,674 from 2004-2013 compared to
$10,464,887 N.J. revenues in same period; that defendants hire "Texas-based sales
representatives, division managers, and a consultant"; and that defendants maintained a
nationwide website); Wish Atlanta, LLC v. Contextlogic, Inc., No. 4:14-CV-00051 (CDL),
2014 WL 5091795, at *2, *4 (M.D. Ga. Oct. 9, 2014) (no general jurisdiction over Del./Cal.
corporation in Georgia despite defendant's contracts with 8 Georgia suppliers; 99,446
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C. ComparativeEvaluationof Where a CorporationIs "At Home"
Daimler requires a comparative evaluation of a corporation's interstate or
international activity. While continuous and systematic affiliations may
196
Justice Ginsburg
possibly still establish a "home" in exceptional cases,
to a domestic
"comparable
be
must
corporation
a
such
emphasized that
97
Though Daimler AG through its subsidiary
enterprise in that State."
maintained a higher volume of enterprise activity within California than most
California small businesses, Justice Ginsburg dismissed those contacts as "slim"
and insufficient for general jurisdiction.1 9 8 Quoting verbatim (for the second
time) Goodyear's requirement that such affiliations be so continuous and
systematic that they render the corporation "at home," 1 99 she concluded that
Daimler AG did not meet this requirement. Her conclusion was supported by
two facts. First, neither Daimler AG nor its subsidiary was incorporated in or
maintained a principal place of business in California. 200 Second, Daimler AG's
in-state activity was not sufficient for general jurisdiction because of its high
level of activity in other states. 20 1

registered Georgia website users; and 16,731 Georgia transactions yielding $506,669.58 in
sales because, underDaimler, general jurisdiction over a corporation is exclusive to principal
place of business or state of incorporation); Estate of Thompson v. Mission Essential Pers.,
LLC, No. 1:11CV547, 2014 WL 4745947, at *4 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2014) (no general
jurisdiction over Ohio corporation in N.C. because only in "exceptional situations" will
general jurisdiction lie outside of the states of incorporation and principal place of business).
State courts have likewise refused to find general jurisdiction based on more extensive
business activity or contacts outside the state. Ali v. Beechcraft Corp., No. N1 1C-12-253
FSS, 2014 WL 3706619, at *3 (Del. Super. Ct. June 30, 2014).
In one case a court refused to dismiss under Daimler because it found the
circumstances "exceptional" in that the defendants were not corporations and thus not subject
to the traditional analyses for determining their place of incorporation or principal place of
business and because the defendants further failed to identify any other country in which
they were "at home." Sokolow v. Palestine Liberation Org., No. 04 Civ. 397(GBD), 2014
WL 6811395, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 2014). But cf Toumazou v. Turkish Rep. of N. Cyprus,
No. 09-1967, 2014 WL 5034621, at *4 (D.D.C. 2013) (no general jurisdiction despite
defendant's forum contacts including offices, employees, putative ambassador, and
interactive website because "the TRNC is 'at home' in northern Cyprus, as its name suggests,
not in the District of Columbia.").
1 96 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 n. 11 (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011)).
197 Id

198 See supra text accompanying note 123.
1 99 Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761 (quoting Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2851).
2009d

201 Id. at 761-62 ("If Daimler's California activities sufficed to allow adjudication of
this Argentina-rooted case in California, the same global reach would presumably be
available in every other State in which MBUSA's sales are sizable. . . . It was therefore
error . . to conclude that Daimler, even with MBUSA's contacts attributed to it, was at home
in California . . .").
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Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion objected that the Court's reasoning
would allow the largest international corporations to escape general jurisdiction
by virtue of the volume of their activity outside any particular state territory. 202
Justice Ginsburg responded by defending her comparative approach to
evaluating contacts. Under this approach, the level of activity required to
establish a corporate "home" is not the volume or character of in-state business.
Rather the approach evaluates whether the nonresident corporation's activity is
focused in the state by considering activity outside the state. 203
It should be noted that this reasoning appears to mischaracterize the plaintiffs
argument. Daimler AG's contacts in California were not only based on a high level of sales
(probably among the highest in the world). Its contacts also included a permanent regional
corporate infrastructure, established through its active supervision of its subsidiary. See
supra text accompanying note 91. Similar contacts did not exist in most states.
202
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 764 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("In recent years, Americans
have grown accustomed to the concept of multinational corporations that are supposedly 'too
big to fail'; today the Court deems Daimler 'too big for general jurisdiction."').
203Id. at 762 n.20.
To clarify in light of Justice Sotomayor's opinion concurring in the judgment, the
general jurisdiction inquiry does not 'focu[s] solely on the magnitude of the defendant's
in-state contacts.' General jurisdiction instead calls for an appraisal of a corporation's
activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide. A corporation that operates in
many places can scarcely be deemed at home in all of them. Otherwise, 'at home' would
be synonymous with 'doing business' tests framed before specific jurisdiction evolved
in the United States.

Id. (alteration in original) (citation omitted). Developing case law demonstrates that the
lower courts have heeded Justice Ginsburg's insistence on a comparative approach. See
Advanced Tactical Ordnance Sys., LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc., 751 F.3d 796, 80204 (7th Cir. 2014) (California corporation's nationwide interactive website did not support
general jurisdiction in Indiana because so holding would open defendant up to general
jurisdiction in every state); Locke v. Ethicon Inc., No. 4:14-CV-2648, 2014 WL 5819824,
at *5 (S.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2014) (despite showing a greater volume of sales in forum state
than in state of incorporation, general jurisdiction unavailable because "[f]atally, the
plaintiffs limit their product sales analysis to Texas and New Jersey without 'apprais[ing]
[the defendants'] activities in their entirety, nationwide and worldwide."') (alteration in
original); NExTT Solutions, LLC v. XOS Techs., Inc., No. 3:13 CV 1030, 2014 WL
6674619, at *7 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 25, 2014) (rejecting general jurisdiction despite defendant's
decade-long relationship with Indiana customers, resulting in $1-2 million in sales annually,
because "XOS appears to have stronger affiliations with other states, namely Florida, where
all of its officers reside, where its office is located, and from where, over the last five years,
it derived more revenue . . . ."); Fed. Home Loan Bank v. Ally Fin., Inc., No. 11-10952GAO, 2014 WL 4964506, at *2 (D. Mass. Sept. 30, 2014) (vacating prior order finding
general jurisdiction under Goodyear, applying "tighter assessment" under Daimler, and
finding "[a]lthough [the defendants] do have significant 'continuous and systematic'
contacts with Massachusetts . . . these defendants have similarly substantial contacts with
dozens of other states."); Estate of Thompson v. Mission Essential Pers., LLC, No.
1:11CV547, 2014 WL 4745947, at *3-4 (M.D.N.C. Sept. 23, 2014) (finding Magistrate
Judge who recommended dismissal had properly considered "percentages or relative
amounts of Defendant's activity attributable to North Carolina in light of Defendant's total
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Justice Ginsburg sees the comparative approach as necessary to prevent the
exorbitant exercise of general jurisdiction by all states where sales are
"sizable." 204 It is possible that multi-state marketing presents a situation where
the foreign corporation has a greater need for commercial and legal
predictability and where the state has a reduced interest in regulating foreign
corporate conduct. If this is so, then neither Daimler's holding nor its
comparative approach would apply with equal force to activity such as operating
a factory or mines in a state. For example, if a foreign corporation operates
factories in two U.S. states, permitting general jurisdiction in those states would
not provide precedent for general jurisdiction in all states where its sales were
sizable.
D. CorporateExpectations
Contacts-based general jurisdiction in multiple states alarmed Justice
Ginsburg because of its disruptive effect on corporate planning. 205 The role of
expectations for general jurisdiction remains uncertain. First, it is uncertain
whether courts should consider expectations in all general jurisdiction cases as
a rough guide to where a corporation is "at home," or only in cases involving
multi-state sales where corporations arguably act in reliance on the law
regulating jurisdiction. Second, it is uncertain whether expectations are relevant
only for determining contacts-based general jurisdiction, or whether they
provide the underlying principle that would also guide the determination of the
place of incorporation and principal place of business. Finally, it is uncertain
whether the relevant expectations are actual expectations of corporate officers
or the hypothetical expectations that should be attributed to reasonable
employees of a reasonable corporation.
The underlying rationale for looking to expectations for general jurisdiction
is undeveloped. 206 The Court's treatment of expectations in other jurisdictional
activities in the U.S. and globally."); Shrum v. Big Lots Stores, Inc., No. 3:14-CV-03135CSB-DGB, 2014 WL 6888446, at *7 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 8, 2014) ("Although [defendant's]
contacts with Illinois are fairly extensive and deliberate, they do not satisfy the general
jurisdiction standard because this court must assess the entirety of [defendant's] activitiesnot just the magnitude of its contacts with Illinois-in determining general jurisdiction.");
see also Marcus Uppe, Inc. v. Global Computer Enters., Inc., No. 14-530, 2014 WL
6775282, at *1, *3 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 2, 2014) (rejecting general jurisdiction over nonresident
corporation that "provides and maintains cloud-based information technology services"
which are utilized by users nationwide because "Plaintiffs theory that Defendant is
geographically rooted nowhere, and thus is everywhere, conflicts with the current
jurisprudence reinforcing that 'the threshold for establishing general jurisdiction is very
high,' and a corporate defendant must specifically be 'at home' in the forum state.").
204Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761.
205
See supra text accompanying note 138.
206 Justice Ginsburg reasoned that general jurisdiction over corporations is analogous to
jurisdiction in an individual's domicile. See supranotes 126-28 and accompanying text. But
the principal decision recognizing domicile-based general jurisdiction paid no heed to
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contexts provides little guidance. On the contrary, the confusion generated by
the role of expectations provides a compelling argument against importing
expectations as a criterion for general jurisdiction over corporations. In
unanimously upholding transient jurisdiction over individuals served in the
forum state, members of the Court divided sharply over the constitutional
relevance of expectations. Four members maintained that tradition and
subsisting practices provided the sole criteria for determining whether
established forms of personal jurisdiction conformed to due process. 207 Four
other members of the Court found transient jurisdiction constitutional based in
part on the fact that longstanding practice created reasonable expectations of
jurisdiction. 20 8
The Court's attention to expectations in specific jurisdiction decisions has
not provided greater clarity. Expectations were first addressed in World- Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 209 where the Court rejected mere foreseeability

of in-state injury as a sufficient basis for specific jurisdiction. Rather, the
majority observed that what was relevant was whether the defendant's contacts
with a state were "such that he should reasonably anticipate being haled into

expectations. Rather the Court explained that such jurisdiction was rooted in reciprocal legal
relationship: a state in protecting the person and property of its domiciliary "may also exact
reciprocal duties," including the duty to answer all lawsuits in its courts. Milliken v. Meyer,
311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940); see Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 443 (1932)
(approving contempt jurisdiction in U.S. courts over U.S. citizen residing in France who
refused to respond to summons). While Blackmer is often cited as authority for citizenshipbased general jurisdiction, the Court explained that it was not addressing jurisdiction for
matters other than allegiance to the sovereign. See id. at 438 n.5.
207
Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (opinion of Scalia, J., joined by
C.J., and White & Kennedy, JJ.).
Rehnquist,
208
"[O]ur common understanding now, fortified by a century of judicial practice, is that
jurisdiction is often a function of geography. The transient rule is consistent with reasonable
expectations and is entitled to a strong presumption that it comports with due process." Id.
at 637 (Brennan, J., concurring, joined by Marshall, Blackmun & O'Connor, JJ.). Justice
Stevens did not mention expectations as a factor that supported jurisdiction. See id. at 640
(Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia identified the problem with expectations: the expectations are
reasonable not because they are fair in some independent moral sense but only because state
courts in fact exercise jurisdiction over persons served in their territory and the duration of
the practice means it is constitutionally valid:

.

That continuing tradition, which anyone entering California should have known about,
renders it 'fair' for [the defendant served in state to be subject to its general
jurisdiction]-at least 'fair' in the limited sense that he has no one but himself to blame.
[The concurring Justices' argument in reliance on expectations] is a circular one.
[F]airness exists here because there is a continuing tradition.
Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J., & Kennedy, J.).
209 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
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court there." 2 10 Justice Brennan objected that such a test provided no guidance
because it was circular. 211
In none of the cases citing this language has the Court actually considered
the reasonable expectations of corporations. 2 12 When the concept originated in
World- Wide Volkswagen, Justice Marshall identified the key dilemma:
I sympathize with the majority's concern that persons ought to be able to
structure their conduct so as not to be subject to suit in distant forums. But that
may not always be possible. Some activities by their very nature may foreclose
the option of conducting them in such a way as to avoid subjecting oneself to
jurisdiction in multiple forums. 213

210Id. at 297. Justice Stevens proposed that the Due Process Clause "gives a degree of
predictability to the legal system that allows potential defendants to structure their primary
conduct with some minimum assurance as to where that conduct will and will not render
them liable to suit." Id. (Stevens, J., concurring). Justice Brennan cited Justice Stevens'
language with approval in a decision for the Court involving a contract dispute. Burger King
Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (Brennan, J.) (quoting World-Wide
Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 297).
211 As Justice Brennan observed, this sort of foreseeability was circular and provided no
useful guide.
The Court suggests that this [foreseeability of being subject to jurisdiction] is the critical
foreseeability rather than the likelihood that the product will go to the forum State. But
the reasoning begs the question. A defendant cannot know if his actions will subject
him to jurisdiction in another State until we have declared what the law of jurisdiction
is.

World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S. at 311 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg
cited Justice Brennan's quotation regarding foreseeability. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134
S. Ct. 746, 761-62 (2014) (quoting Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472).
212 In Burger King, the Court considered the knowledge and reasonable expectations of
a natural person. See Burger King, 471 U.S. at 480. It rejected the lower court's finding that
the individual defendant had no reason to anticipate suit in Florida, finding instead that
substantial evidence indicated the Michigan resident actually knew he was affiliating with a
Florida-based corporation and voluntarily reached out to enter into a structured, twenty year,
million dollar, long term contract with the Florida corporation. Id. From this the Court
concluded that specific jurisdiction was presumptively valid. Id.
Justice Breyer, concurring in Nicastro, would have permitted an exercise of specific
jurisdiction if the manufacturer had delivered goods into the stream of commerce with the
expectation they be purchased in the forum state. J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131
S. Ct. 2780, 2792 (2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting World- Wide Volkswagen, 444
U.S. at 297). He suggested that such expectations might be established by evidence of a list
of potential customers in the forum state. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). See Adam N. Steinman,
The Lay of the Land Examining the Three Opinions in J. McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v.
Nicastro, 63 S.C. L. REv. 481, 509 (2012). Evidence of such a list would evidently not
persuade either the plurality or the dissent, and the development of an evidentiary record on
such matters would consume resources with no corresponding benefit.
213 World-Wide Volkswagen, 444 U.S at 316 (Marshall, J., dissenting, joined by
Blackmun, J.)
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If party expectations mean reasonable legal expectations, then the test is
circular. 2 14 If the criterion is the actual anticipation of litigation, then the inquiry
requires a digression into factual matters that experience demonstrates are of
dubious relevance. 215
E. Place ofIncorporationand PrincipalPlace ofBusiness
While a majority of the Court agrees to the new formal rules that will usually
restrict general jurisdiction over corporations to their place of incorporation or
principal place of business, members of the Court embrace fundamentally
different theories of jurisdiction that will affect their future application of the
formal rules. While no Justice has elaborated his or her theory fully, it is possible
to distinguish at least two approaches. Justice Kennedy views jurisdiction as
proper only when a defendant "manifest[s] an intention to submit to the power
of a sovereign." 2 16 Justice Ginsburg has criticized this theory. 2 17 While failing
to propose an alternative theory, she advances arguments that rely heavily on
218
the need for convenience as a principal justification for general jurisdiction.
1. Place ofIncorporation
Different theories ofjurisdiction may lead to different conclusions about the
place or places of incorporation in disputes that raise the question. Normally the
place of incorporation is not in question. But questions can arise when
corporations reincorporate in another state, 2 19 when corporations act as alter
2 14

&

Justice Ginsburg herself addressed the problem of expectations in her dissenting
opinion in Nicastro. While a plurality found that the British manufacturer did not expect to
be subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey, where one of its products allegedly caused serious
injuries, Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2790 (Kennedy, J.), Justice Ginsburg protested that any such
expectation would have been unreasonable under the circumstances, which included a wellestablished pattern of decisions approving the exercise of jurisdiction in similar cases. Id. at
2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
215 This is illustrated by the record in Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102
(1987), which contained conflicting self-serving affidavits swearing that a party did or did
not expect to be subject to jurisdiction in California. Id. at 107. While Asahi produced split
opinions, no Justice found the affidavits bearing on actual expectations of corporate agents
and no opinion relied on them.
to be useful,
21 6 Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2788 (plurality opinion for four members of the Court).
217Id. at 2798 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting, joined by Kagan & Sotomayor, JJ.).
2 18
E.g., Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014) (citing von Mehren
Trautman, supra note 109, at 1144-63); id at 760 (relying on ease of determination as the
principal ground for supporting principal place of business). But see Note, Personal
Jurisdiction-GeneralJurisdiction-DaimlerAG v. Bauman, 128 HARV. L. REv. 311, 311
(2014) (positing that "Justice Ginsburg continues to apply a theory of personal
jurisdiction ... that focuses fundamentally on fairness to both litigants.").
219In theory a corporation can be incorporated under only one sovereign's law and
cannot change its place of incorporation. Cf 1 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 41 (1935) (text by vested rights theorist advocating idea of corporate
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egos or agents for each other, and when conduct sufficient to create a
corporation under one state's law is not sufficient under another's. 220 When the
place of incorporation shifts, questions can arise about whether the place should
be determined at the time of the events giving rise to litigation or at the time of
the commencement of the action.
The theories supporting general jurisdiction may lead to different
conclusions in close cases. If a defendant's place of incorporation provides a
constitutionally permissible basis for general jurisdiction because the
corporation voluntarily submits to that sovereign's courts for all claims, then the
corporation's power to control its submission would seem to include the power
to terminate submission. Such an approach would privilege conduct creating a
de jure corporation. Under this approach general jurisdiction would focus on the
question of whether a corporation exists under the law of attempted
incorporation at the time of the commencement of the action.
If, in contrast, judicial convenience, fundamental fairness, and the need to
fill gaps in the law of specific jurisdiction provide underlying reasons for
general jurisdiction in the place of incorporation, then the corporation's power
to manipulate its place becomes less important. Under such an approach, general
jurisdiction might focus on whether the place of liability-creating conduct
recognized the existence of a corporation at the time of liability-creating
conduct.
Similarly, without some explanation for why corporations are
constitutionally subject to general jurisdiction in their state of incorporation,
there is little guidance as to the issue of whether unincorporated associations of
various kinds should be treated like corporations or as groups of separate
persons. 22 1 In Daimler, Justice Ginsburg criticized the agency test applied by
the Ninth Circuit but did not propose an alternative. Her critique, in the context
of due process analysis and without citation to any authority, strongly suggests
that the Court will apply an independent due process analysis for such
relationships. Perhaps a federal standard of agency, enterprise liability, and
domicile based on single unchanging original place of incorporation). In fact, a corporation
with a continuing legal identity can readily change its place of incorporation by creating a
new corporation in a second state, transferring its assets, and dissolving. See Black & White
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 523-24
(1928).
2 20
E.g., Paper Prods. Co. v. Doggrell, 261 S.W.2d 127, 128-29 (Tenn. 1953)
(recognizing de facto corporation under Tennessee law where failure to file charter resulted
in disregard of corporate existence and partnership liability under law of Arkansas, where
charter should have been filed).
221 The defendant in Perkins, for example, was a hybrid limited liability company with
some attributes of partnerships and some of corporations. See Perkins v. Benguet Consol.
Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437, 439 n.2 (1952) (treating the defendant as a corporation because it
had that status under state law). But see Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 98 N.E.2d
33, 37-38 (Ohio 1951) (observing that defendant had attributes of a corporation for purposes
of state service of process rules but not necessarily for purposes of limiting liability of
shareholders).

2015]

GENERAL PERSONAL JURISDICTIONAFTER DAIMLER

147

piercing the corporate veil will be necessary in order to prevent local doctrines
from eviscerating the due process restrictions on general jurisdiction over
corporations. But the issue has never been presented to or decided by the Court.
2. PrincipalPlace ofBusiness
Because a corporation can manipulate its place of incorporation, the
identification of a principal place of business becomes of great practical
significance for plaintiffs. This is illustrated by a corporation that manufacturers
and sells its cars exclusively in California but that incorporates in Mordor. Can
that corporation avoid general jurisdiction in California by locating its corporate
headquarters in sovereign Mordor? Before Daimler, such a manufacturer would
be subject to general jurisdiction in California based on its contacts there. After
Daimlerthe answer will depend on how courts define principal place of business
and whether they recognize the facts as falling within an exceptional form of
contacts-based general jurisdiction.
Justice Ginsburg acknowledged the rule that a corporation is subject to
general jurisdiction in the state where it maintains its principal place of business,
but she offered no reason for the rule. 222 Her opinion in Daimler offers a
tentative explanation based on the need to provide at least one place for litigating
all claims against a corporation, 223 but this does not explain why general
jurisdiction need exist anywhere when specific jurisdiction is available; nor does
it explain why general jurisdiction should exist outside the place of
incorporation.
There are sound reasons for not restricting general jurisdiction to place of
incorporation. Permitting general jurisdiction where a corporation maintains its
principal place of business may serve as a limit on the power of corporations to
manipulate the states where they are subject to jurisdiction, preventing
corporations from evading responsibility to answer lawsuits in a state where
they actually engage in all or most of their business activity.
Unfortunately, in explaining convenience as a reason for general
2 24
jurisdiction, Justice Ginsburg cited Hertz Corp. v. Friend, an opinion
222 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853-54 (2011).
See Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 597 (observing that scholars cited by the Court provided no
legal authority for the rule that general jurisdiction existed where a corporation maintained
its principal place of business and proposing that the rule arose from the accepted practice
by which service on an authorized agent at the corporate office both satisfied notice
requirements and established firm basis for all-purpose jurisdiction).
Neither tradition nor judicial practice at the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment clearly requires the rule. Justice Holmes comes close to insisting that a
corporation can be subject to general jurisdiction in only one state, the state of its
incorporation, though he confronted an issue of immunity with mixed elements of legislative
and adjudicatory jurisdiction. See Bergner & Engel Brewing Co. v. Dreyfus, 51 N.E. 531,
532 (Mass. 1898).
223
See supra text accompanying notes 127-29.
224 Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 130 S. Ct. 1181 (2010).
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construing the meaning of Congress's use of the terminology "principal place
of business" in an entirely different legal context. In that case, the Court applied
the nerve-center test under which the principal place of business is usually
where the corporation locates its administrative offices, 225 not where it engages
in most of its business. 226
At issue in Hertz was the federal diversity statute, which authorizes federal
courts to hear certain cases between citizens of different states and assigns a
corporation's citizenship both in its place of incorporation and principal place
of business. 227 There are strong reasons to question whether principal place of
business should be given the same meaning for both diversity jurisdiction and
for general personal jurisdiction. 228 The corporate headquarters test provides a
single, easy-to-apply test that Congress plainly imposed and can easily alter.
Corporations have no incentive to move their principal place of business in order
to evade Congress's definitions. 229

225Id. at 1184 (principal place of business in the diversity statute "is best read
as
referring to the place where a corporation's officers direct, control, and coordinate the
corporation's activities. . . . [And i]n practice it should normally be the place where the
corporation maintains its headquarters . . . .").
226
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 (2014) (quoting Hertz Corp., 130 S. Ct.
at 1193 ("Simple jurisdictional rules ... promote greater predictability.") Federal courts have
subject matter jurisdiction over some civil actions between citizens of different states. U.S.
CONST. art. III; see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012). Congress defines a corporation's
citizenship as both its place of incorporation and its "principal place of business." Id
§ 1332(c). Lower courts were long divided over whether "principal place of business" meant
the place where a corporation conducted most of its business (the so-called "muscle test") or
the place where it located its corporate headquarters (the so-called "nerve center test"). Hertz
Corp., 130 S. Ct. at 1191. The Supreme Court adopted the nerve-center test for reasons
specific to the context-policy goals unique to diversity jurisdiction and to the legislative
history of the statute. See Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 598. The Court relied on the greater
judicial convenience of the nerve center test, but it did so because of clear legislative history
indicating that Congress wanted to avoid imposing a test that would be difficult to apply. Id
Moreover, the Court in imposing the nerve center test on the diversity statute did so with full
awareness that it was offering a prudential construction of a statute that Congress was
empowered to alter by subsequent legislation. Id. (identifying reasons why the nerve center
test for subject matter jurisdiction is not necessarily an appropriate measure for personal
jurisdiction).
22728 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1).
228 Congress's purpose in defining corporate citizenship to include its principal
place of
business was to eliminate federal subject matter jurisdiction. Creating two places of
citizenship deprives federal courts of subject matter jurisdiction in up to twice as many
cases-destroying diversity in claims brought by plaintiffs that are citizens of either of the
corporation's places of citizenship. In contrast, defining general personal jurisdiction to
include a corporation's principal place of business potentially doubles the number of courts
that may constitutionally exercise personal jurisdiction.
229 Even if corporations wanted to evade federal court (which they usually do not) in
order to prevent diversity, they would need to predict in advance the state citizenship of
adversaries.
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In contrast, corporations will certainly seek to structure their activity,
including the location of their corporate headquarters, so as to avoid being
subject to general personal jurisdiction. The parties did not brief, nor did the
Court address, the question whether good policy or due process requires
deference to such corporate decisions.
While Justice Ginsburg's passing reference to Hertz should, accordingly,
not be read as endorsing the nerve center test for defining principal place of
business for general personal jurisdiction, it is a safe prediction that corporations
will aggressively argue that the test applies to general personal jurisdiction in
cases where it benefits them.
Courts should carefully distinguish diversity and general jurisdiction. When
a corporation engages in all or most of its business in the state of California, due
process should not prevent California from exercising general jurisdiction just
because the corporation locates its place of incorporation and corporate offices
in Mordor. Courts should either find that the corporation's principal place of
business is in California, or they should find that the corporation engages in such
continuous and systematic contacts so as to render it essentially at home in the
230
forum "comparable to a domestic enterprise in that State."
F. Reasonablenessas a Limit on GeneralJurisdiction
For specific jurisdiction, the Court prescribed a two-part analysis that
requires a consideration of (1) minimum contacts and (2) the reasonableness or
fairness of exercising jurisdiction. 23 1 Goodyear left open the question of
whether general jurisdiction requires a comparable two-part analysis of (1)
where the corporation is "at home," and (2) the reasonableness or fairness of
exercising jurisdiction. 232
230

Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 758 n. 11. See infra Part IV.G (discussing exceptional cases).
E.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Super. Ct., 480 U.S. 102 (1987); Burger King Corp.
v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985). See generally PETER HAY ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS
§ 5.12, at 368-69 (5th ed. 2010); WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, § 4.8A(1), at 205. This approach
always attracted some criticism, see Solimine, supra note 106, at 42 nn.178-79 (discussing
scholarly criticism), and its present status is uncertain. See also Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at
588 n.228 (noting the absence of evaluation of the second part of the analysis in recent
opinions); Howard B. Stravitz, Sayonara to FairPlay and SubstantialJustice?, 63 S.C. L.
REV. 745, 766 (2012) (concluding that Nicastro "logically questions the continued authority
of the fairness branch to due process analysis," even for specific jurisdiction.)
232
See Hoffheimer, supra note 4, at 5 88-90 (arguing that Court's opinion suggests few,
if any, situations where general jurisdiction will require two-part analysis and concluding
that the only possible surviving use of the reasonableness-fairness factors would be to
eliminate jurisdiction where, despite systematic and continuous contacts, other
considerations militate against jurisdiction). Hoffheimer proposed that general jurisdiction
might be available for claims by North Carolina plaintiffs based on Goodyear USA's high
level of activity in North Carolina but that reasonableness limits might prevent general
jurisdiction over actions by nonresidents. Id. Daimler's disapproval of reasonableness
suggests that North Carolina may not exercise general jurisdiction because it is neither
23 1
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The Ninth Circuit applied the two-part test in Daimler and found both that
sufficient contacts existed and that the exercise of jurisdiction was
reasonable. 2 33 Justice Sotomayor also applied the two-part test in her
concurrence, but reached a different conclusion. First, she observed that Daimler
AG's subsidiary engaged in sufficient contacts to permit general jurisdiction. 234
Second, she reasoned that "no matter how extensive [defendant's] contacts with
California, [general jurisdiction] would be unreasonable given that the case
involves foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant based on foreign conduct,
and given that a more appropriate forum is available." 235
Justice Ginsburg decided the case without addressing the reasonableness of
exercising general jurisdiction and criticized Justice Sotomayor for employing
reasonableness as an additional limitation on general jurisdiction. In a footnote
that avoided any reference to the experience of lower courts in applying the twopart test, Justice Ginsburg first observed that reasonableness was never a "freefloating test" and then declared that it was limited to specific jurisdiction. 236 To
avoid any misunderstanding, she added: "When a corporation is genuinely at
home in the forum State, however, any second-step inquiry would be
superfluous."

237

Restricting general jurisdiction to places where corporations are "at home"
makes it less likely that general jurisdiction over them will be unreasonable.
Consequently, Justice Ginsburg probably did not see any role for a separate
consideration of reasonableness. 2 38 While reaching the issue was unnecessary
Goodyear USA's state of incorporation or principal place of business. But see Daimler, 134
S. Ct. at 764-65 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (agreeing that California lacks general
jurisdiction but on the ground that jurisdiction would be unreasonable in cases involving
foreign plaintiffs suing a foreign defendant for foreign conduct, and given the existence of a
more23appropriate
forum).
3
See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
234
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 763-64 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
23 5
1d at 764.
236I. at 762 n.20 ("True, a multipronged reasonableness check [has been]
articulated . . . but not as a free-floating test. Instead, the check was to be essayed when
specific jurisdiction is at issue.") (citation omitted). Justice Ginsburg's observation that
reasonableness is not free-floating is curious in light of the fact that Justice Sotomayor's
concurrence relies precisely on the fact that it is part of a larger two-part analysis. Id. at 76465 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
237Id at 762 n.20.
238Accord Monestier, supra note 18, at 263-65 (observing that courts applying the
reasonableness prong to general jurisdiction analysis found it superfluous and noting that the
reasonableness inquiry would foster uncertainty). The reasonableness-fairness test has
become unpopular with some members of the Court. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra
note 54, at 56. Justice Ginsburg criticized Justice Sotomayor's approach by asserting that
deciding the case on reasonableness grounds would be "a resolution fit for this day and case
only." Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762 n.20. Whatever the merit of this criticism, Justice
Ginsburg's additional argument that reasonableness unnecessarily complicates jurisdictional
decision-making is unpersuasive. Id. Courts have required both contacts and reasonableness.
Cf Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (requiring dismissal when defendant had
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to the Court's decision and arguably imprudent, 239 the answer is clear for now:
general jurisdiction requires only a single inquiry into whether the corporation
is "at home" in the forum state.
G. Candidatesfor Exceptional Cases
While finding that Daimler AG was not subject to contacts-based
jurisdiction in California, the Court conceded that prior decisions did not hold
that corporations are subject to general jurisdiction only in their places of
incorporation and principal places of business. 240 The opinion thus suggeststentatively-that contacts-based general jurisdiction may still be permissible in
exceptional cases. 24 1
This part considers five situations that remain viable candidates for general
jurisdiction, either because the level of the defendant's in-state activity
establishes a principal place of business in the state or because a corporation's
activity makes the corporation "at home" in the state.
1. ForeignCorporationConductingAll or Most ofIts Business in the
Forum State
A strong case for continuing general jurisdiction would be presented if a
corporation is formed to do business in one state and does all of its business
there, but is incorporated in, and establishes a principal place of business
outside, the state. A similar case is presented by a corporation that evolves so
that its business becomes concentrated exclusively in one state. It is difficult to
distinguish such situations from corporations that engage in business in more
than one state but conduct the majority of their business in a single state.
The state where a corporation does all or most of its business would
unquestionably have general jurisdiction under the older requirement of "doing
business." Under the Court's newer approach, general jurisdiction should still
no contacts with the forum regardless of how convenient or reasonable the forum might
otherwise be). This has provided greater rather than less convenience because it allows them
to dismiss when either is absent. Id. Similarly, while the Court identified five reasonableness
factors, courts were never required to consider all of them. Id.
239 Until we know what the tests for place of incorporation and principal place of
business are, it is not inconceivable that general jurisdiction at such places might be
unreasonable in some situations. For example, if New Jersey is the principal place of business
of MBUSA, whose jurisdictional contacts are attributable to Daimler AG, it might be better
to leave undecided whether Daimler AG is subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey for torts
committed in a foreign country against foreign citizens with no connection to either New
Jersey or any U.S. territory.
240
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 760; see id. at 770 n.9 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("I accept
at face value the majority's declaration that general jurisdiction is not limited to a
corporation's place of incorporation and principal place of business . . . .").
241 Id. at 761 n. 19. Courts have been reluctant to find such exceptional cases. See cases
cited supra note 195.
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exist under one of two possibilities. First, courts may find that conducting all or
most business in a state establishes that state as the corporation's principal place
of business. 242 Second, courts may find that the affiliations with the state in such
situations are sufficiently systematic to make the corporation "at home" in the
state "comparable to a domestic corporation," thus falling under the reserved
exception for contacts-based general jurisdiction.
2. ForeignNational CorporationEngagingin Most oflts U.S. Business
in One State
In Daimler, neither the parent manufacturer nor its subsidiary sold most of
its products in California. There was no reason why California should have
general jurisdiction rather than any other state, and the Court did not see a way
to permit jurisdiction in one or two states without authorizing all states to
exercise general jurisdiction where sizable sales occurred.
A far more compelling case for general jurisdiction would be presented
where a foreign national corporation engages in most of its U.S. business
activity in a single state, even if the corporation engages in more activity outside
the United States. 243 On the one hand, in such a case U.S. residents with claims
against the corporation have a compelling argument for a forum in the United
States. On the other hand, authorizing jurisdiction in the state where the
corporation engages in most of its domestic business would restrict the potential
states where the defendant must respond to litigation.
3. Foreign CorporationConductingAll or Most oflts Business Activity
in the UnitedStates but MaintainingNo PrincipalPlace ofBusiness or
Place ofIncorporationin Any State
Another situation requiring general jurisdiction is suggested by the dilemma
resulting from J McIntyre Machinery, Ltd. v. Nicastro, where a person injured

in his or her home state may not seek relief in a court in that state with specific
jurisdiction over the manufacturer. Where the manufacturer is a foreign national
corporation with its principal place of business outside the United States, the
corporation may evade general jurisdiction in any U.S. court. Even under the
exceptions proposed above, the corporation will evade general jurisdiction if it
does not engage in most of its business in a single state.
242 This would require repudiating any effort to apply the nerve center test to personal

jurisdiction. See supra note 226; see also Monestier, supra note 18, at 268 n.2 10.

243 The interstate basis of much due process law has been obscured by the over-general
form of the rules. See Perdue, supra note 181, at 737 (arguing that federalism limits on due
process emerged in World-Wide Volkswagen as an expression of particular concern with
interference with sister-state authority). But see Monestier, supra note 18, at 267 (objecting
that general jurisdiction would not exist under the comparative analysis required by
Daimler).
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The need for filling this jurisdictional gap is greatest in situations where a
foreign corporation engages in most of its business in the United States. While
Congress has the authority to authorize personal jurisdiction based on the total
contacts with the United States (either because the United States is its principal
place of business or based on exceptional contacts-based general jurisdiction),
in the absence of such legislation, there should be no constitutional obstacle to
allowing the state where the most U.S. contacts occur to exercise general
jurisdiction. 244
4. Corporationwith an OutsizedPresence in the State
The manufacturer and its subsidiary in Daimler differed only in the volume
and value of their sales from many businesses engaged in interstate production
and marketing of products aimed at an end market of individual consumers. A
broad prohibition of contacts-based general jurisdiction was arguably necessary
to prevent all businesses from being required to answer lawsuits where they
engage in extensive sales.
A far stronger case for general jurisdiction can be made, without the risk of
being applied abusively, to foreign corporations that establish a uniquely
important business presence in a state. An example would be an automobile
manufacturer that establishes a huge factory in a state. The factory may supply
a large part of the domestic market. The corporation may play a preeminent role
in the state economy as owner of real property (possibly acquired through
eminent domain) and may exert considerable influence on the political process.
The corporation probably negotiated valuable tax concessions and other benefits
as a condition to entering or remaining in the state.
Regardless of the corporation's activity outside the state, it would be
reasonable to permit exceptional contacts-based general jurisdiction over a
corporation where it maintains such an imposing physical presence and where
it plays such a dominant political role. General jurisdiction would, however,
open the state courts to claims against such a corporate defendant by the Polish
driver injured in Poland. If the risk of abusive jurisdiction cannot be avoided by
the doctrine of forum non conveniens, then courts should restrict the reasonable
extension of general jurisdiction to claims by state residents or claims in which
the state has an interest. While there is some reason to fear the Polish plaintiff
who wants the benefit of a U.S. court, the risks of surprise and disadvantage are
reduced by limiting general jurisdiction to a small number of states where the
corporation operates major facilities.
Prohibiting general jurisdiction over such a corporate defendant poses real
threats to confidence in corporate accountability. If the single biggest employer
in Kentucky orchestrated the murder of Kentucky citizens in Poland where the
citizens were distributing Bibles or organizing a union, courts could permit the
244

But see Monestier, supra note 18, at 267 (noting that Daimler requires focus on a
foreign corporation's contacts with a particular state).
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victims' estates to sue the foreign corporation in Kentucky by finding that the
level of in-state activity constituted an exceptional form of contacts-based
jurisdiction, making the foreign corporation comparable to a domestic one. Such
an exception would not open the floodgates to abusive litigation. 24 5
5. CorporationsMaintaininga PermanentPhysical Presence in the
State By OperatingFactories, Mines, or Other Non-Sales Related
Activities
The Court promulgated formal rules of general application restricting
contacts-based jurisdiction in two cases in which the defendants' contacts were
established by distributing and selling products to consumers in the forum state.
Although Justice Ginsburg wrote nothing suggesting that the rules were limited
to corporations engaged in marketing activity, 24 6 there is reason to question

whether the rules will apply with equal force to in-state corporate activity other
than marketing.
First, general jurisdiction based on sales was problematic even under tests
that focused on presence. 247 Scholars addressing the adverse effect of
jurisdiction on interstate commerce have presented compelling arguments for
limiting jurisdiction based on marketing activity, 24 8 and Justice Ginsburg

245 Lower courts have been reluctant to find general jurisdiction based solely on a
prominent presence in the territory. E.g., In re Asbestos Products Liability Litigation (No.
VI), No. 875, 2014 WL 5394310, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2014) (finding that constructing
and operating a large refinery in the Virgin Islands did not establish general jurisdiction when
it was only one of many refineries operated by the corporation). But no court has yet
confronted a corporation that employs a majority or plurality of its workforce in a state where
it is neither incorporated nor maintains its principal place of business. The example of
general jurisdiction over the Boeing Company in the state of Washington has been discussed
in teacher's manuals and listservs. Email from Deborah Challener, Professor of Law,
Mississippi College School of Law, to author (Dec. 30, 2014, 19:51 CST) (on file with
authors).
246 On the contrary, there is reason to believe that Justice Ginsburg meant the rules,
formulated in general terms, to apply broadly. Justice Sotomayor's concurring opinion
interpreted the rules to prevent the parents of a child injured in a foreign hotel from suing the
foreign corporate owner in the U.S. even if the corporation has a massive presence in
multiple U.S. states. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 773 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Ginsburg
responded to other arguments by the dissent but did not clarify that her formal rules need not
deprive the states of jurisdiction in such a case.
24 7
See Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Equity Co., 262 U.S. 312, 315 (1923) (Brandeis,
J.) (holding that the statute authorizing service of process on a railroad agent soliciting
business in the state for claims unrelated to activity in the state was a violation of the
Commerce Clause). Justice Brandeis deliberately avoided deciding whether the exercise of
general jurisdiction under such statutes violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 318 & n.5
(citing cases).
248
See Brilmayer et al., supra note 127, at 745-46.
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repeatedly relied on burdens on interstate commerce as a reason for limiting

personal jurisdiction. 249
Second, free market and interstate commerce values served by restricting
jurisdiction based on marketing activity may not be present in other cases. On
the contrary, it may be appropriate to require nonresident corporations investing
in a state to submit to the same legal burdens as resident corporations that they
compete with or even displace-including general jurisdiction. Tradition and
policy both support broad general jurisdiction over a foreign corporation that
operates factories and mines or that invests heavily in local real estate. 2 50 Courts
could recognize that contacts-based general jurisdiction in such situations falls
under exceptions tentatively provided in Daimler on the theory that the foreign
corporation's activity establishes affiliations that make it "at home" and
comparable to a domestic corporation. Engaging in extensive productive or
investment activity in one state does not routinely entail similar activity in other
states. Accordingly, finding contacts-based general jurisdiction based on
operating factories, mines, or farms does not present the danger that the
corporation will be subject to general jurisdiction in many other states. 25 1
V. CONSTITUTIONAL OVERREACH
A. The Mixed ConstitutionalMotives for Restricting Contacts-Based
GeneralJurisdiction
The Court's recent general jurisdiction decisions are accompanied by
unanimous and near-unanimous opinions that propound clear rules rather than
standards. Their immediate effect is clear: a reduction of jurisdiction over
nonresident corporations engaged in activity in more than one state or country.
The broader effect of the decisions is less clear for two reasons. First, the
Court offers qualifications or exceptions that invite strategies for evading its
24 9

See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
The argument for general jurisdiction is even stronger over foreign national
corporations inasmuch as states may constitutionally exclude them from engaging in some
business in the state and may more directly regulate them. U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. The Full
Faith and Credit Clause does not require recognition of the corporation under foreign
national law. Id. The Privileges and Immunities Clause does not apply to any corporations.
Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.S. 557, 561 (1899). The Equal Protection Clause allows
greater regulation of foreign nationals, including prohibition of or limits on property
ownership. Asbury Hosp. v. Cass Cnty., 326 U.S. 207, 211 (1945).
251 For example, Goodyear USA may operate factories in a few states while it completes
significant sales in all states. Lower courts have thus found that significant investment in real
estate supports general jurisdiction. See supra note 30. Nevertheless, courts relying on
Daimler are reluctant to find general jurisdiction on this basis. E.g., In re Asbestos Prods.
Liab. Litig. (No. VI), No. 875, 2014 WL 5394310, at *9 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 23, 2014) (finding
no general jurisdiction based on ownership and operation of a large refinery when a
corporation operated more facilities outside the territory, citing restrictive language of
Daimler).
25 0
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general rules.2 52 Second, it is questionable whether a majority of the Court
endorses the history and theory that Justice Ginsburg marshaled in support of
the new rules.
Justice Ginsburg's opinions advocate a particular agenda for reforming the
law of personal jurisdiction proposed in the 1960s and 1970s by Professors
Arthur T. von Mehren and Donald T. Trautman. The goal of those scholars was
to rationalize personal jurisdiction by generalizing the legal trends as they
understood them at that time. Specifically, von Mehren and Trautman proposed
expanding specific jurisdiction to the point where state courts could
constitutionally exercise jurisdiction over all cases in which the state had an
interest or state residents were affected. 2 53 Given the expanding role they
proposed for specific jurisdiction, they regarded most of the forms of general
jurisdiction as unnecessary and irrational. They thus urged the elimination of
almost all forms of general jurisdiction. Nevertheless, to ensure that there would
always be at least one court with jurisdiction, these scholars proposed that a
single state (or two) should always have general jurisdiction-states convenient
254
for the defendant.
252

See supra Part IE; see also Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 18, at 208 (proposing
"a method of recalibrating specific jurisdiction to account for the demise of general contacts
jurisdiction").
253
See von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 109, at 1172. Trautman was on the Harvard
Law School faculty from 1953 to 1993. Von Mehren was on the Harvard Law faculty from
1946 to 1991. Justice Ginsburg attended Harvard Law School from 1956 to 1959. This
Article does not advance the dubious proposition that the Court should cite more scholarship.
Its point is that Justice Ginsburg relies on an idiosyncratic academic program that rests on a
dated, overly optimistic generalization of the trend of the Court's decisions formulated about
the time she was in law school; that the program's predictions were demonstrably inaccurate
with respect to specific jurisdiction and general jurisdiction over natural persons, see supra
notes 203-07 and accompanying text; and that the program failed to explain one-half of its
proposal, now repeated as black letter law by the Court, that general jurisdiction exists at a
corporation's principal place of business. See supra note 126. There is good reason why most
scholars in the past generation have paid little attention to the article relied on by Justice
Ginsburg, and it is doubtful whether several members of the Court actually embrace its
motivating utilitarian values. See infra note 256 and accompanying text (discussing Justice
Kennedy's view ofjurisdiction); see also Note, supra note 218, at 318 & n.78 (asserting that
"Justice Ginsburg's conception of the 'at home' test for general jurisdiction mirrors von
Mehren and Trautman's view of general jurisdiction.").
254 For corporations they proposed the place of incorporation but also recognized that
the principal place of business would be valid. Von Mehren & Trautman, supra note 109, at
1141-42. They neither cited cases for general jurisdiction at the principal place of business
nor explained why the theoretical demand for a single place should lead to general
jurisdiction in more than one place. Id.
In more recent years Professor Brilmayer has advocated von Mehren and Trautman's
reform proposals with minor changes. Brilmayer et al., supra note 127, at 759. Professor
Brilmayer submitted an amicus brief in support of Daimler AG. Brief of Professor Lea
Brilmayer, supra note 133. Cf Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 760 n.16 (2014)
(referring to argument in Brilmayer brief that Daimler AG's contacts were insufficient in
response to Justice Sotomayor's contention that the issue was not properly before the Court).
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Justice Ginsburg's opinions not only advocate this general reform program;
her historical narrative presents the evolution of the Court's decisions as closely
following it.2 55 In contrast, other members of the Court embrace a theory of
personal jurisdiction for which the libertarian goal of freeing out-of-state
defendants from the threat of jurisdiction is a greater priority than rationalizing
the law. Justice Kennedy gave voice to this vision ofjurisdiction in his plurality
opinion in Nicastro. There he proposed that a defendant's volitional submission
forms the predicate for all personal jurisdiction. He regards incorporating in a
state or establishing a principal place of business in its territory as signaling
"general submission to a State's powers." 256 Justice Kennedy was studiously

&

Justice Ginsburg repeatedly cites the scholarship of Professors von Mehren,
Trautman, and Brilmayer. See id. at 754, 755, 760; Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A.
v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851, 2853, 2854 (2011); see also Note, supra note 218, at 318
n.78 (noting that Justice Ginsburg cites the von Mehren and Trautman article "five times in
Daimler, five times in Nicastro, and four times in Goodyear.")
Von Mehren and Trautman developed their theories without considering their impact
on class action litigation. The problems are on full view in a case like Bristol-Myers Squibb
Co. v. S.C. (Anderson), where users of a prescription drug commenced a products liability
action against the manufacturer in California state court. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. S.C.
(Anderson), 337 P.3d 1158 (Cal. 2014). The state supreme court remanded for
reconsideration in light of Daimler, and the intermediate appellate court held that California
lacked general jurisdiction over the claims by nonresident plaintiffs but could exercise
specific jurisdiction over such claims, stating that "[the defendant] has engaged in
substantial, continuous economic activity in California, including the sale of more than a
billion dollars of Plavix to Californians. That activity is substantially connected to the
[nonresident plaintiffs'] claims, which are based on the same alleged wrongs as those alleged
by the California resident plaintiffs. Further, [the defendant] does not establish it would be
unreasonable to assert jurisdiction over it." Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Super. Ct., 228 Cal.
App. 4th 605, 613, 175 Cal. Rptr. 3d 412, 415 (2014). See generally Rhodes & Robertson,
supra note 18, at 228 (predicting that nationwide class actions will be disrupted by courts'
refusal to grant general jurisdiction over defendant with respect to non-resident plaintiffs'
claims, forcing plaintiffs to rely on specific jurisdiction, and that post-Daimler, "the
'connectedness' or 'relatedness' requirement is likely to emerge as the central battleground
in personal jurisdiction litigation."). Cf Evans v. Johnson & Johnson, No. H-14-2800, 2014
WL 7342404 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 23, 2014) (dismissing a products liability action with respect
to 95 of 96 plaintiffs who were non-residents of Texas).
255
See, e.g., Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 753, 755 n.7, 757 (citing Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495
U.S. 604 (1990); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); J.
McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011)).
256
Cf Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. at 2787 (Kennedy, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Scalia
Thomas, JJ.) ("Citizenship or domicile-or by analogy, incorporation or principal place of
business for corporations-also indicates general submission to a State's powers.") (citing
Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2854). He notably omitted any mention of contacts-based general
jurisdiction. See generally Perdue, supra note 181, at 741 (arguing that despite Justice
Kennedy's rhetorical emphasis on sovereignty, his approach is "based on a particular notion
of individual liberty" and on the view that state power is limited to that conferred by the
defendant); Steinman, supra note 212, at 497-98 (characterizing Justice Kennedy's
submission theory as potentially a break with decades of precedent).
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silent on whether any form of contacts or activity could ever support general
jurisdiction.
Justice Kennedy and other members of the Court advocating the libertarian
theory nevertheless joined Justice Ginsburg's opinions restricting general
jurisdiction because her doctrine and historical explanation comport with their
goals of restricting personal jurisdiction. And Justice Ginsburg has crafted
opinions that avoid potential sources of disagreement. Thus, in Daimler Justice
Ginsburg avoids committing the Court to any form of contacts-based
jurisdiction, proposing that, if it exists, contacts-based jurisdiction applies only
in truly exceptional cases. 257 But the same Justices who support Justice
Ginsburg's theory when it eliminates personal jurisdiction are not prepared to
accept Justice Ginsburg's reform agenda or her understanding of legal history
when it results in the expansion of jurisdiction or even, as in Nicastro, the
retention of an established form of specific jurisdiction. 258
Today, no one on the Court supports a relaxation of due process limits on
personal jurisdiction. In the rare case where a plaintiff proposes a new theory
for expanding specific jurisdiction, the Court can readily produce unanimous
opinions that avoid theory and find a lack of minimum contacts under
established precedents. 259 But in situations where the competing theories lead
to different outcomes, the decisive votes are cast by a minority of Justices who
subscribe to neither theory. The current mix of views embraced by members of
the Court leaves plaintiffs deprived of general jurisdiction based on one theory
and of specific jurisdiction based on another.260
B. UnnecessarilyBroad
The weak links among the claims, claimants, and the forum state in Daimler
might appear to support the view that broad contacts-based general jurisdiction
serves no necessary rational function and would be used by plaintiffs solely to
obtain strategic advantages by forcing litigation in forums that were
inconvenient for corporate defendants. 26 1 But even if most contacts-based
257

See supra note 141 and accompanying text.

258 There is also no sign that the Court will apply the rationalizing program to personal
jurisdiction over natural persons. See supra note 174 (discussing Burnham, 495 U.S. 604).
259
E.g., Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) (Thomas, J.) (unanimous
opinion) (holding that Nevada lacked personal jurisdiction over intentional tort claims
arising from seizure of a Nevada resident's property in Georgia, citing precedents requiring
conclusion that Nevada lacked personal jurisdiction when contacts established with the
forum state were established exclusively by the plaintiff).
260
A clear example of this dilemma would arise if the manufacturer in Nicastro sold
most of its products in Delaware or operated a factory there. While Nicastro holds that the
worker injured in New Jersey cannot get specific jurisdiction there, Daimlerprovides support
for the argument that there is no general jurisdiction in Delaware because the corporation is
incorporated in and maintains its principal place of business in Britain.
261 Such concerns are evident in Justice Ginsburg's repeated references to the imaginary
Polish case and to her characterization of the plaintiffs theories as "grasping" and
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general jurisdiction is unnecessary, it continues to serve a valuable role in
securing plaintiffs access to courts in a limited range of cases. Moreover, while
the real danger of abusive jurisdiction is speculative, 262 alternative methods of
discouraging and eliminating abusive jurisdiction render a broader elimination
of general jurisdiction unnecessary.
1. ContinuingNeedfor GeneralJurisdiction
Contacts-based general jurisdiction remains necessary to secure access to a
forum in the United States when (1) specific jurisdiction is not available in any
state, 2 63 and (2) the defendant is incorporated and maintains its principal place
of business in a foreign country. 264 The need for such cases increases with the
Court's recent restriction of specific jurisdiction in Nicastro.265 And it is
possible that corporate reorganizations in response to the Court's holding in
Daimler will further increase the number of corporations conducting all or most
of their business in the United States that may seek to evade both specific and
general jurisdiction, even for claims arising in the United States. 266

"exorbitant." See supra notes 84, 136 and accompanying text; see also Monestier,supra note
18, at 258-60 (arguing that Daimler holding is justified in part because "broad assertions of
general jurisdiction encourage forum shopping" and "allow[ing] assertions of general
jurisdiction in a forum because the defendant is doing business in the forum seems to reward
plaintiffs for gamesmanship").
262 There is no question that members of the Court are convinced that abusive
jurisdiction is a real danger requiring a constitutional solution. The empirical evidence is
inconclusive. See Solimine, supra note 106, at 60 (noting lack of empirical evidence of
widespread forum shopping); see also id. at 57 n.246 (recounting a communication from
defense counsel expressing lack of manufacturers' concern with risk of jurisdiction).
Scholars long recognized that contacts-based general jurisdiction carried the
potential for forum shopping given the fact that due process did not require plaintiff contacts
with the forum. This provided a strong ground for the reasonableness requirement. E.g.,
Walter W. Heiser, Toward Reasonable Limitations on the Exercise of GeneralJurisdiction,
41 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1035, 1040-41 (2004).
263 Only in cases where a federal court is near the border of a neighboring state, where
federal statutes authorize broader jurisdiction, and in cases based on federal law where there
is no state court with jurisdiction may federal courts exercise jurisdiction broader than that
of the state court. FED. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)-(2).
264 Examples of such cases are considered in Part IV.G (discussing scope of possible
exceptions to elimination of contacts-based general jurisdiction).
265
See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2804 (2011) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting); Paul D. Carrington, Business Interests and the Long Arm in 2011, 63 S.C. L.
REv. 637, 641 (2012) (Nicastrowas "wrongly decided").
266 Before Daimler, a plaintiff like Nicastro might hope to get general jurisdiction in
Delaware if the British manufacturer operated a factory there that made other, unrelated
products. After Daimler, even if the Delaware plant is the British manufacturer's biggest
asset and even if Delaware is the state where it conducts most of its business, it is now
questionable whether the defendant is subject to general jurisdiction there.
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2. Alternative Groundsfor Limiting Abusive Jurisdiction
Alternative grounds exist that would prevent the abuse of general
jurisdiction without eliminating it in cases where it provides the sole access to
the courts.

a. Reasonableness
Justice Sotomayor's concurrence, deploying reasonableness as an
additional limit on personal jurisdiction, adequately prevents abusive
jurisdiction. The reasonableness criterion has proved useful in administering the
law of specific jurisdiction and had achieved substantial support among lower
courts in applying contacts-based general jurisdiction. 267
Insisting on a far broader rule, Justice Ginsburg disparages Justice
Sotomayor's approach for resolving only the issues in the case presented to the
Court. But Justice Ginsburg's opinion does not satisfactorily explain why a
broad rule eliminating contacts-based general jurisdiction was necessary to
achieve the prophylactic goal of preventing abusive jurisdiction. 268
b. Forum Non Conveniens and Other DoctrinesPrevent the
"Exorbitant"Exercise ofJurisdictionover DaimlerAG by the Polish

Driver in California
In addition to the possibility of recognizing reasonableness limits on the
exercise of general jurisdiction, federal courts can prevent abusive jurisdiction
under the existing doctrine of forum non conveniens. 269 The facts in Daimler
provide an appropriate case for dismissal on this ground. Indeed, given the lack
of plaintiff ties to the forum state and weak forum state interest in the litigation,
a refusal to dismiss for forum non conveniens would arguably constitute an
abuse of discretion.

267 Scholars also defended the reasonableness requirement. See supra note 176. But see
supra note 174 (noting the impatience of some Justices with reasonableness/fairness
inquiry).
268 Her opinion suggests two reasons for the prophylactic rule. The first lies in her
expressed scorn for "free floating" notions of reasonableness and fairness. See supra notes
236-37 and accompanying text. The second lies in an implicit distrust of lower court
competence to administer such a standard. This may reflect her conviction that lower courts
had radically expanded jurisdiction. Factual support for the claims is uncertain and was not
provided by any advocate.
269 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 n.6 (1981) (citing Gulf Oil Corp. v.
Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508-09 (1947)).
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C. DisregardofHistoricalRoots and Subsisting Nature ofPractice
The Court's rejection of contacts-based general jurisdiction over
corporations in order to promote some theoretical goal disregards the historical
roots and subsisting nature of the practice. History and practice were decisive
considerations, if not the conclusive criteria, for all members of the Court in
upholding transient general jurisdiction, 270 despite scholarly criticism and lack
of international recognition of the practice. 27 1 The actual scope of judicial
authority exercised by states should be a primary criterion in determining the
scope of due process. Disregarding evidence of historical practice is inconsistent
as a matter of constitutional theory and creates divergent bodies of case law
governing natural persons and corporations. 272
D. New Formalism:Rebirth of Vested Rights
1. FormalRules Prevent Good Analysis
InternationalShoe looked beyond form in an effort to regulate the economic
reality of commercial activity. 273 The Court's new formalism is bad theory to
the extent it prevents a concrete consideration of meaningful differences
between kinds of cases. 2 74 The new rules are also bad theory to the extent they
substitute new metaphors ("at home") for old terminology ("substantial
contacts"), old terminology that was itself an attempt to avoid unhelpful
metaphors ("presence"). Justice Ginsburg effects a similar shift without adding
clarity by adding language emphasizing corporate "affiliations" rather than
contacts with the forum. 27 5
The family imagery suggested by "home," reinforced, perhaps
unintentionally, by the Latin roots for "affiliation," seems uniquely
270 See Burnham v. Super. Ct., 495 U.S. 604, 619 (1990) (Scalia, J.); id at 628 (White,
J., concurring in part) ("Although the Court has the authority under the [Fourteenth]
Amendment to examine even traditionally accepted procedures and declare them invalid,
. . there has been no showing here or elsewhere that as a general proposition the rule is so
arbitrary and lacking in common sense in so many instances that it should be held violative
of due process in every case.") (citation omitted); id at 636-37 (Brennan, J., concurring); id
at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring).

271 See WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, § 4.10, at 225 n.565 (citing scholarship critical of
transient jurisdiction); id. at 225 (suggesting that transient jurisdiction conflicts with "widely
held views of exorbitant jurisdiction").
2 72
The confusion resulting from diverging lines of authority is aggravated for
unincorporated associations, and the Court's recognition of this may explain its failure to
articulate coherent rules addressing jurisdiction based on corporate joint ventures and
enterprise liability.
273 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
2 74
For example, the formal rules do not distinguish between interstate marketing
and in-state manufacturing, mining, and farming.
activities
2 75
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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inappropriate for the analogical work the images are asked to perform.
InternationalShoe insisted that corporations do not even occupy space so as to
establish "presence" apart from the legal acts society empowers them to perform
through agents. 276 It should be unnecessary to add that the same corporations do
not make homes with fireplaces or form family relationships. Adopting
anthropomorphizing metaphors does not aid analysis but does leave the Court's
opinions open to ridicule, inviting comparison to a notorious misconstruction of
corporations as "people" based on a misunderstanding of a recent decision
extending First Amendment rights to corporations. 277
2. FormalRules ObscureBad Results
The Court's formal rules, coupled with its novel metaphors, do not just
prevent consideration of appropriate facts. They tend to conceal the Court's
movement towards bad rules: rules that generate undesirable results for many
cases.
Justice Ginsburg expressed alarm at the prospect of abusive jurisdiction and
her concomitant goal of facilitating corporate planning, embracing arguments
repeatedly advanced by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States. 278 The
Court's consideration of economic arguments has a long tradition. The future
Justice Brandeis successfully employed the practice of marshalling social and
economic research in arguments to the Court. But his practice relied on
substantial research on economic effects, not just on an appeal to the personal
views of members of the Court. Moreover, such economic arguments were
advanced in support of social legislation and against judicial restrictions on state
regulatory authority.
The Court's formal rules restricting contacts-based jurisdiction are based on
economic assumptions devoid of empirical support about adverse consequences
on trade. And rather than freeing states to regulate economic behavior, the
Court's new rules impose due process prohibitions on the exercise of
jurisdiction by state courts.
Taken to their logical conclusion, the new formal rules introduce a new era
of vested rights for corporations. Prohibiting states from disregarding corporate
expectations formed outside the state has the effect of cloaking corporations
with unprecedented immunities that were never suggested by earlier decisions,
276 Int'1 Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316-17.
27 7
See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010) (holding
that corporations and other associations enjoy First Amendment right to spend money in
advocating views); Jim Haag, Who Said It? Romney, Obama or Mr. Burns, THE VIRGINIANPILOT (Oct. 22, 2012), http://hamptonroads.com/2012/10/who-said-it-romney-obama-ormr-burns, archived at http://perma.cc/4BWJ-CBMZ (posing a question of whether the
statement "Corporations are people. . ." was made by a presidential candidate or television
cartoon character Mr. Burns).
278
See Brief of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce II, supra note 133; Brief of the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce I, supra note 17.
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immunities unthinkable to either the drafters of the Due Process Clause or to the
authors of the seminal case 279 imposing due process limits on personal
jurisdiction. 280
E. FederalismConcerns
Requiring constitutional deference to expectations of jurisdictional
28
immunity by foreign corporations rests on questionable economic policy. 1 But
even if the Court's restriction of contacts-based general jurisdiction promoted
economic growth, good policy would not provide a sufficient ground for the
Court to interfere with state jurisdiction. Grounding such limitations in the Due
Process Clause reveals a laudable concern with the liberty interest of out-ofstate defendants. But it arguably exceeds the Court's constitutional authority by
interfering with the powers assigned to two different sovereign authorities under
the Constitution.
1. Interference with Legislative and Regulatory Power of States
Interference with state sovereignty was the first "deep injustice" that Justice
282
Sotomayor identified in the majority opinion in Daimler. Prohibiting states
from exercising contacts-based general jurisdiction constitutes an activist
expansion of due process jurisprudence that results in a direct interference with
the sovereign authority of states. Justice Black long ago identified this
constitutional danger. Concurring in the result in International Shoe, he
expressed the concern that the new standard-requiring minimum contacts and
fair play and justice-might be applied in the future to limit jurisdiction. And
Justice Black regarded the threat of such limits as an interference with the
283
powers reserved to state courts.

2 79

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
We borrow the language ofjurisdictional immunity from Justice Sotomayor. Daimler
AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 772 (2014) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (providing a legally
accurate description of the intended effect of the majority rule).
281 Both authors question whether any empirical evidence supports the need for the rule
and remain unconvinced that it will achieve economic benefits.
282
Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 772 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) ("[T]he majority's approach
unduly curtails the States' sovereign authority to adjudicate disputes against corporate
defendants who have engaged in continuous and substantial business operations within their
boundaries."). While acknowledging that specific jurisdiction will exist in many cases,
Justice Sotomayor observed, "[W]e have never held that to be the outer limit of States'
authority under the Due Process Clause." Id at 772 n.10; accordRhodes & Robertson, supra
note 18, at 263-69 (noting the threat to state sovereignty posed by restriction of personal
jurisdiction and urging reformulation of jurisdiction to preserve state power to protect its
citizens).
283 Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 324-25 (1945) (Black, J.).
2 80

164

OHIO STATE LA WJOURNAL

[Vol. 76: 1

2. Preemption of CongressionalAuthority to Regulate Interstate and
Foreign Commerce
Imposing due process limits on contacts-based general jurisdiction
interferes with powers that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress to
regulate interstate and foreign commerce. 284 Congress remains the branch better
qualified to adopt rules that are shaped either by empirical policy considerations
or by political values. 285
F. Neglect of Other ConstitutionalValues
The Court's formal rules restricting contacts-based general jurisdiction
protect corporations' liberty interests and prevent states from interfering with
interstate and foreign commerce. But the Court's exclusive concern with due
process protections for defendants continues a troubling pattern of neglecting or
undervaluing other constitutional rights and interests. 2 86 The focus on due
process has prevented consideration of rights protected by and powers regulated
under the Commerce Clause and the First Amendment. It also neglects residual
rights including meaningful access to courts implied by a Constitution
establishing justice 287 and expressly protected by due process. 288
284 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Paradoxically, one of the arguments advanced by the
United
States government in favor of reversing in Daimler was the need to leave room for Congress
to regulate jurisdiction over foreign corporations engaged in international trade. Brief for the
United States, supra note 62, at 3. By holding that foreign corporations are immune to
general jurisdiction outside their place of incorporation and principal place of business, and
by grounding this immunity in a liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause, the
Court limits the power of Congress to enact appropriate legislation to regulate litigation over
foreign corporations engaged in substantial trade activity in the U.S. While Congress could
still empower federal courts to exercise specific jurisdiction based on the level of sales
activity in the U.S. when the activity relates to the claims, Congress can no longer require a
foreign corporation to submit to general jurisdiction based on the volume of contacts
unrelated to the claims unless they are tantamount to making the U.S a principal place of
business or fall under a tentative exception.
It seems undesirable that a corporation that may conduct virtually all its business in
U.S. territory should not be required to answer claims in U.S. courts. See supra Part IV.G.
The Constitution vests Congress, not the Court, with the power to regulate foreign commerce
and thus the power to regulate personal jurisdiction in such cases.
285 The due process basis of Daimlerwill similarly preclude treaties under which federal
or state courts are authorized or required to exercise general jurisdiction outside a
corporation's place of incorporation or principal place of business.
286 One need not go so far as to say with Justice Brennan that International Shoe's
"almost exclusive focus on the rights of defendants[] may be outdated," in order to appreciate
that the defendant's liberty interests are not the only constitutional values at issue in
restricting personal jurisdiction. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286,
308 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
287 U.S. CONsT. pmbl.
288
See Christopher v. Harbury, 536 U.S. 403, 412-15 & n.12 (2002).
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Daimler is a missed opportunity. The particular problems of sales provided
an occasion for the Court to fine tune its constitutional analysis rather than to
adopt even more metaphors for contacts. The recent evolution of the Court's
application of its tests for general jurisdiction exposes the inadequacy of the
Court's constitutional framework. Due process considerations do not
satisfactorily explain the comparative approach that the Court requires to
determine where a corporation is "at home." Similarly, while the Court explains
the general jurisdiction rules for corporations as analogous to those for
individuals, 289 it fails to explain why individuals, who suffer far greater burdens
when forced to litigate in distant courts, enjoy far fewer protections than
corporations. 290
The dormant Commerce Clause offers a promising foundation for limits on
jurisdiction over foreign corporations based exclusively on sales. But the
Commerce Clause has disappeared from the Court's jurisprudence. 291 Similarly,
the First Amendment might offer a more contextually specific approach to
limiting personal jurisdiction over extraterritorial speech that balances a state's
interest in protecting persons from suffering harm within the state against the
shared interests of states in preventing speech from subjecting the speaker to
unanticipated jurisdiction in distant states. But the First Amendment is not
292
available as a separate limitation on personal jurisdiction.
G. Improper ConsiderationofInternationalLaw and ForeignPractices
Justice Ginsburg turned to the international context of the dispute in
Daimler only after she concluded that general jurisdiction is prohibited under
purely local U.S. legal principles. 293 She nevertheless considered arguments
from international law that supported a restriction of general jurisdiction. These
included the fact that contacts-based general jurisdiction is not recognized in the

289

290

See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 772-73 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,

concurring) ("[T]he majority's approach creates the incongruous result that an individual

defendant whose only contact with a forum State is a one-time visit will be subject to general
jurisdiction if served with process during that visit, but a large corporation that owns
property, employs workers, and does billions of dollars' worth of business in the State will
not be, simply because the corporation has similar contacts elsewhere (though the visiting
individual surely does as well)." (citations omitted)).
The incongruous treatment is not limited to transient jurisdiction. An individual with
no contacts with a forum remains subject to general jurisdiction based on technical domicile
there until he or she establishes a new domicile. See supra note 206. Scholars have
questioned jurisdiction based on such technical domicile. See HAY, supra note 231, at 398;
WEINTRAUB, supra note 6, § 4.11, at 225.
291 See supra note 243 and accompanying text.
292
Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 780 n.12 (1984).
293
See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762.
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European Union, 294 that foreign government objections to general jurisdiction
had impeded reciprocal agreements on the enforcement of judgments, 295 that
foreign investment in the United States "could" have been discouraged by such
general jurisdiction, 296 and that general jurisdiction based on "doing business"
has resulted in "international friction." 297
While none of these considerations directly grounded the Court's holding,
Justice Ginsburg nevertheless observed that "[c]onsiderations of international
rapport thus reinforce our determination that subjecting Daimler to the general
jurisdiction of courts in California would not accord with the 'fair play and
substantial justice' due process demands." 298 It should be noted that Justice
Ginsburg avoided suggesting that foreign practices are due even the vague
deference known as "comity." Instead she coined a new terminology with no
known legal meaning: "international rapport."
The Court's brief consideration of international norms would have been
better omitted because it was unnecessary to the holding. While the Court did
emphasize the foreign facts of the case, nothing in its analysis paid special
attention to international aspects of the case. Moreover, the treatment of
international norms is troubling. Justice Ginsburg cited partisan arguments and
speculations that appeared to lack factual or empirical support in the record.
Finally, her reference to the EU's more restrictive approach to personal
jurisdiction illustrates why foreign practices are of little value as a guide to due
process. The EU regulations resulted from a process of negotiation among
sovereigns in which commercial interest groups played a significant role in
pressuring member states to submit to more restrictive forms of jurisdiction.
Furthermore, EU restrictions on general jurisdiction place limited burdens on
European plaintiffs, who can reach any defendant's home state in a few hours
by train.
Justice Ginsburg misses the irony inherent in finding that the Due Process
Clause limits general jurisdiction in a way that mirrors the restrictions
negotiated by foreign corporate lawyers and adopted by independent sovereigns
during the heyday of neoliberalism. Whether the United States should
voluntarily adopt such restrictions is debatable as a matter of policy, especially
in the absence of the quid pro quos that induced European member states to
submit. But the adoption of such restrictions on the sovereign power of state
courts should be left to the states and to Congress.

294Id. at 763 (citing EU regulations authorizing jurisdiction at a corporation's domicile
and specific jurisdiction at its regional branch for claims arising out of the operations of the
regional
branch).
295
Id. (citing arguments in Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 2 (No. 11-965)).
29 6
Id. (citing arguments in Brief for the United States, supra note 62, at 2 (No. 11-965)).
297 Id. (citing argument from Brief for Respondents, supranote 135, at 35 (No. 11-965)).
29 8
d. (citations omitted).
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VI. CONCLUSION

The Due Process Clause prevents states from exercising general jurisdiction
over corporations except where the corporation is "at home." 299 Daimlermoves
the Court far towards restricting this corporate "home" to the place of
incorporation and principal place of business. 300 Despite the Court's emphasis
on the historical roots for these holdings, this Article shows that eliminating
general jurisdiction in states where corporations maintain a permanent,
significant legal presence or other comparable substantial level of activity
constitutes a radical departure from settled law.30 1
The new law announced by Daimler may produce appropriate results in
cases where a state has no reason for providing a forum-where, for example, a
Polish driver injured in Poland brings a product liability claim in California
against a German car manufacturer that does unrelated business in California. 302
But it produces questionable results in other cases. For example, where defective
German products kill Alaska residents in Alaska, the German manufacturer may
be exempt from both specific 303 and general personal jurisdiction in Alaska. 304
Before Daimler, Alaska residents could sue the German manufacturer in
California, where it maintains a regional headquarters and conducts billions of
dollars in annual business. In deciding a case with facts more like the imaginary
Polish driver's, Daimler announces a broad rule that closes the California
courthouse to the Alaska residents. Unless the Court limits Daimler, the Alaska
plaintiff must litigate in Germany or nowhere.
This Article argues that the Court has moved too far, too fast towards
restricting general personal jurisdiction. It questions the historical pedigree
offered for a narrow definition of a corporation's "home." It asserts that policy
benefits attributed to the new rule are speculative, while adverse policy
consequences are real and severe. Finally, this Article insists that, even if
restricting jurisdiction produces economic benefits, such policy benefits do not
provide a principled constitutional foundation for interfering with the authority
of states to require legal entities present and active in their territories to answer
lawsuits against them-especially when that authority, if not quite as old as the
Republic, is as old as the corporation.

299
300

See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.B.4.b.

301 See supra Part II.

302 Justice Ginsburg was especially concerned by this imaginary case. See supra notes
100-01 and accompanying text. This Article points out that jurisdiction in such a case is
adequately limited by the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See supra note 269 and
accompanying text.
303 J. Mclntryre Mach. Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780 (2011).
304 Even before the holding in Daimler, the German manufacturer did not engage in
sufficient continuous and general business activity to be subject to general jurisdiction in
Alaska.

